Interruptible Load as an Ancillary Service in Deregulated Electricity Markets by Le, Tuan
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN 
DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
 
 
by 
 
 
LE ANH TUAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Electric Power Engineering 
Chalmers University of Technology 
Göteborg, SWEDEN 
2004 
 
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
Interruptible Load as an Ancillary Service in Deregulated Electricity Markets 
LE ANH TUAN 
 
© LE ANH TUAN, 2004 
 
 
 
ISBN 91-7291-542-0  
Doktorsavhandlingar vid Chalmers Tekniska Högskola 
Ny series nr 2224 
ISSN 0346-718x 
 
 
 
 
Technical report No. 491 
ISSN 1651-498X 
School of Electrical Engineering 
Chalmers University of Technology  
SE-42196 Göteborg 
SWEDEN 
Phone:  46-31-7721000 
Fax: 46-31-7721633 
http://www.elteknik.chalmers.se
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chalmers Bibliotek, Reproservice 
Göteborg, Sweden 2004 
 ii
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
ABSTRACT 
 
Power companies world-wide have been restructuring their electric power systems 
from a vertically integrated entity to a deregulated, open-market environment. 
Previously, electric utilities usually sought to maximize the social welfare of the 
system with distributional equity as its main operational criterion. The operating 
paradigm was based on achieving the least-cost system solution while meeting 
reliability and security margins. This often resulted in investments in generating 
capacity operating at very low capacity factors. Decommissioning of this type of 
generating capacity was a natural outcome when the vertically integrated utilities 
moved over to deregulated market operations. The erstwhile objective of 
maximizing social welfare with distributional equity was then replaced by a profit-
maximizing objective with efficiency as the main criterion for the generating 
companies. As a consequence, power producers are no longer responsible for the 
system reliability margins in deregulated markets. Additionally, new investments 
in generating capacity are not easily forthcoming since private investors look for a 
high rate of return of capital employed, which becomes increasingly difficult to 
ensure in a competitive environment. These factors, being a consequence of 
deregulation, have triggered a need for the research and implementation of 
interruptible load management – ILM. In an ILM program, the customer enters 
into a contract with the independent system operator (ISO) to reduce its demand  
as and when requested. The ISO benefits in having additional reserve for its 
security management services, while the customer benefits from reduction in 
energy costs and from incentives provided by the contract. Though this concept is 
not new, it has attained a new significance because of the deregulation. 
 
This thesis proposes a model for a competitive market for interruptible load 
customers where they can offer to reduce (a part of) their demand, as an ancillary 
service provision to be procured by the ISO. The operational objective of the 
proposed market would be minimizing the total ILM procurement costs while 
satisfying the system operational constraints. It is shown that an interruptible load 
market can help the ISO to maintain the operating reserves during peak load 
periods. Econometric analysis reveals that a close relationship exits between the 
reserve level and the amount of interruptible load service invoked. It was also 
found that at certain buses, market power could exist which may lead to unwanted 
inefficiencies in the market. Investing in generation capacity at such buses can 
mitigate this. 
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The thesis also examines the role of interruptible load during contingencies and 
peak demand in the power system. In particular the ability of the interruptible load 
market in providing transmission congestion relief is analyzed. In the proposed 
congestion management scheme, interruptible loads can specifically identify those 
load buses where corrective measures are needed for relieving congestion in a 
particular transmission corridor. 
 
While examining the role of interruptible load in providing for congestion 
management, it is necessary to arrive at a long-term solution for persistent 
congestions, i.e., bottlenecks in the system. An answer to this, is investment in 
reserve generation at strategic locations in order to provide for efficient congestion 
relief. Long-term investment needs for fast start-up generators that can alleviate 
transmission bottlenecks and provide additional operating reserves were 
investigated by a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis and a least-cost optimization 
scheme. 
 
Keywords: deregulated electricity market, interruptible load management, 
ancillary services, congestion management, reserve generation, optimal power 
flow, least-cost planning. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents a brief overview of power industry deregulation and the 
situation in Sweden in this regard. Various implications of deregulation, such as 
decreasing reserve margins, price volatility, and lack of incentive for investment 
in generation capacity, are discussed. In this context, interruptible load 
management is gaining increasing importance as a means for additional 
operating reserve in the system. The objectives of this study, aimed at addressing 
various issues related to operating of the interruptible load management 
programs in deregulated electricity markets are laid out. A brief outline of 
various chapters of this thesis is also provided. 
1.1 Deregulation of the Electricity Supply Industry 
 
Since the last two decades, many electric utilities world-wide have been forced to 
change their ways of doing business, from vertically integrated functioning to 
open-market systems. The reasons have been many and differed across regions 
and countries.  
 
In developing countries, the main issues have been high demand growth 
associated with inefficient system management and irrational tariff policies, 
among others. This has affected the availability of capital investment in generation 
and transmission systems. In such a situation, many countries were forced to 
restructure their power sectors under pressure from international funding agencies. 
On the other hand, in developed countries, the driving force has been to provide 
the customers with electricity at lower prices and to offer them greater choice in 
purchasing electricity. 
 
Deregulation was undertaken by introducing commercial incentives in 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. The main objective of 
deregulation is to achieve a clear separation between production and sale of 
electricity, and network operations. The erstwhile vertically integrated system 
operation has been separated into independent activities. The generation 
companies sell energy through competitive long-term contracts with customers or 
by bidding for short-term energy supply at the spot market.  
 
On the other hand, with significant levels of "economy of scale", it was natural 
for the transmission sector to become a monopoly. It was therefore necessary to 
introduce regulation in transmission so as to prevent it from overcharging for its 
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services. Consequently, the transmission grid has to be a neutral monopoly subject 
to regulation by public authorities. New regulatory framework has been 
established to offer third parties "open access" to the transmission network so as to 
overcome the monopolistic characteristics of transmission. 
 
In this deregulated environment, a system operator is assigned the central 
coordination role with the responsibility of keeping the system in balance, i.e., to 
ensure that the production and imports continuously match the consumption and 
export. It is required to be an "independent" authority without any involvement in 
the market competition nor owning any generation facility for business (except 
some for emergency use). Hence its name Independent System Operator, largely 
known as ISO. 
 
Generator
Transmission
Distribution
Customer
Power Trader
Indepen-
dent
System
Operator
Energy Money Information
Market
Operator
 
Figure 1-1: Typical structure of a deregulated power system 
Figure 1-1 shows a typical structure of a deregulated power system with the 
complex interactions amongst different actors in the system. 
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Among the countries whose electricity supply industry has been deregulated, the 
South American countries, including Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, 
and Brazil were the initiators of deregulation in, as early as, 1982. The United 
Kingdom, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Sweden and other 
European countries have subsequently opened up their power sectors to 
competition in the nineties. It should, however, be noted that the form of 
deregulation differs in each country and even among various systems in the United 
States. 
 
1.2 The Swedish Electricity Market 
 
The Swedish electricity market was reformed on January 1, 1996 when 
competition was introduced regarding production and sales of electricity. The 
Swedish market now consists of electricity producers, final customers, network 
owners, power trading companies, and an ISO, Svenska Kraftnät, which also 
manages the national high voltage transmission network. Some of the 
characteristic features of the Swedish market are as follows [1]: 
 
 Final electricity customers, everything from industries to households, 
must have an agreement with an electricity supplier in order to be able to 
buy electricity.  
 The production plants are owned by the electricity producers. In Sweden, 
about half the power produced is hydropower and the other half nuclear 
power.  
 A power trading company can have several roles: that of an electricity 
supplier as well as a balance provider. Further, the power trading company 
can either have the balance responsibility itself or purchase this service 
from another company. The power trading company can purchase power 
on Nord Pool or directly from an electricity producer or another trading 
company. 
 The network owners are responsible for transmitting the electrical energy 
from the production plants to the consumers. This is achieved though the 
national grid, the regional networks and the local networks, which are all 
owned by different network companies. The regional networks transmit 
power from the grid to the local networks and sometimes to major 
consumers, for instance industries. The local networks distribute power to 
the final customers within a certain area. All network owners report their 
consumption and production measurements to Svenska Kraftnät's 
settlement system. 
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 Svenska Kraftnät owns the national grid and has the role of independent 
system operator. This means that it ensures that production/imports 
correspond to consumption/exports and that the Swedish electricity plants 
work together in an operationally reliable way. 
1.2.1 Reduced Operating Margins  
 
In the erstwhile vertically integrated utilities, the system operator sought to 
maximize the social welfare with distributional equity (meeting the load at all 
time) as the main criteria, for the system as a whole. The operating paradigm was 
based on achieving the system solution while meeting reliability and security 
margins. This often led to investments in such generating capacity that operated at 
very low load factors. As a result, the prices charged to customers would be high, 
since the utility required to recover its operational and investment costs. 
 
Decommissioning of generating capacity, particularly those operating at low 
load factors, was thus an expected outcome when such vertically integrated 
utilities moved over to deregulated market operations. As can be seen from Figure 
1-2, in Sweden, several generating units have closed down since 1996. About 2000 
MW capacity was decommissioned in 1998 and about 1200 MW in 1999. Most of 
these units were gas based or condensing power units and were primarily being 
used for peak hour generation, and had high operating costs [2]. 
 
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
MW
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Commissioned De-Commissioned
 
Figure 1-2: Capacity addition versus decommissioning in Sweden, after 
deregulation (Source: Swedish National Energy Administration, 
http://www.stem.se)
 4
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
Figure 1-3 shows the average monthly market prices in Nordpool for the 
Swedish market from 1996 (since its participation in Nordpool). The first year of 
the reformed electricity market in Sweden was a dry year, and the system price 
rose up to the end of the year. The price then dropped sharply until the end of 
2000. The drop in price was mainly due to the abundant precipitation (hydro 
energy) during these years, and also to a high level of competition among 
suppliers for attracting higher energy supply shares in the market and attracting 
customers, in the initial years. However, since the costly generation capacity could 
not sustain such low market prices, as shown in Figure 1-3, capacity 
decommissioning was the outcome. One of the reason for the subsequent 
increasing trend in average monthly market prices (Figure 1-3) since 2001 could 
be attributed  to the resultant decrease in system operating margins which has 
acted as a signal to the major players. The other reason for that was because of the 
low levels in water reservoirs, for example during the period between January and 
April of 2003, while this is a high demand season due to the cold weather. It can 
therefore be noted that the spot price has well reflected the demand and supply 
condition in the market.  
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Figure 1-3: Spot market price in Nordpool for the Swedish electricity market 
(Source: Nordpool ASA, http://www.nordpool.no) 
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Figure 1-4 shows the total system capacity and total system load from 1996 to 
2005 (2005 is forecast data). It is seen that there is very little new generating 
capacity planned for, during this period, while some more generating capacity is 
scheduled to be closed down. As a result, total system capacity has been 
decreasing, while the total system demand is increasing, thus making the system 
reserve margin lower. 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
MW
1996 1997 1998 2000 2005
System capacity System maximum load
 
Figure 1-4: Sweden: The system margin is decreasing.  
(Source: Swedish National Energy Administration, http://www.stem.se). 
 
It should be noted that in deregulated electricity markets, new investments in 
generating capacity are not easily forthcoming since these are prerogatives of 
private investors who look for a high internal rate of return on a project, and that 
becomes increasingly difficult to ensure in competitive markets with uncertainties 
in market prices and other associated risks. This has an adverse impact on 
generation capacity addition in the system and leads to operating the system with 
very low security margin. 
1.3 Interruptible Load Management (ILM) 
 
In response to the reducing operating margins, particularly so in deregulated 
markets, interruptible loads could act as a useful tool for the ISO that can be 
invoked at times of critical system conditions, and provide the much needed 
system demand reduction and an operating reserve that can be activated within a 
short time.  
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In an interruptible load program, the customer signs a contract with the local 
utility or the ISO, as the case may be, to reduce its demand as and when requested 
(Figure 1-5). The utility benefits by way of reduction in its peak load and thereby 
saving costly generation reserves, restoring quality of service and ensuring 
reliability. The customer benefits from reduction in its energy costs and 
particularly from incentives provided by the local utility or the ISO. Provisions 
also exist in certain markets for the customers to offer their ability to modify their 
demand, which is referred to as demand-side bidding.  
 
Utility/
ISO
Contracts that some of its
load can be disconnected
as and when requested
Offers reduced
electricity tariffs
Customer
 
 
Figure 1-5: A typical interruptible load scheme 
1.3.1 ILM as an Interest to Different Players in the Electricity Market 
 
With power systems now operating under a capacity scarcity regime, in contrast to 
operating in classical vertically integrated and usually over-invested systems, 
energy efficiency and load management have assumed increasing importance. 
Even if prices are high during peak hours, uncertainty related to future profit has 
the consequence that the willingness to invest in peaking capacity, needed only 
occasionally, is very low. This has increased the interests among different market 
participants to offer load management and energy efficiency programs in a well 
functioning market. Incentives for interruptible load management can be derived 
by various players and actors in the market as described below: 
 Customers: Customers are motivated by the potential of reducing energy 
costs, additional incentives from the utility, the possibility of freedom of 
choice and new customer services. 
 Electricity providers: The electricity provider would be motivated by the 
possibility of diversification into new profitable business areas and 
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customers services. Utilizing customer flexibility in order to reduce 
procurement costs in periods of high spot prices is another incentive. 
 Grid companies: Grid companies are motivated by reduced marginal 
losses, improved utilization time, postponed investments and improved 
quality of services. 
 System operator: The system operator is motivated by the possibility of 
improved operational reliability by including the demand interruption as a 
reserve for peak power reduction and for the provision of ancillary 
services. 
 
1.3.2 Issues in Interruptible Load Management  
A. Tariff Design 
 
Most often, the problem lies in devising the rate structure, which should be 
incentive compatible to both utility and customer i.e., minimize utility’s costs and 
maximize the economic benefit of customer. Implementation of interruptible tariff 
involves unbundling electricity services and offers customers a range of rate 
reliability choices. Therefore, finding optimal utility-customer interactions and 
contracts is similar to finding the equilibrium point in an economic analysis to 
determine the market price and quantity. There exist some oscillations to reach the 
equilibrium point. These oscillations depend on the qualitative and the quantitative 
response of the suppliers and the customers and estimation of these responses are 
critical. It is important to estimate the potential of an ILM program to reach the 
equilibrium point. Updating the incentive rate design with the potential estimates 
is the crux of devising an ILM program [3]. 
 
B. Market Design 
 
Although most present day interruptible contracts are pre-specified in advance, 
energy market-place transactions can also allow for more frequent updates like 
one-hour spot-price, calculated based on system operating conditions and forecasts 
of how much interruptible energy will be purchased from customers. Customers, 
who choose to sell interruptible energy, do so by communicating the secure energy 
level they can offer [4]. Also, in an electricity market some generating companies 
could offer low cost but rather inflexible units while other may opt for more 
expensive but highly flexible generation. Even customers could be given the 
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opportunity to offer their ability to reduce their demand during periods of peak 
prices. This diversity of options helps to clear the market at a lower price. 
 
Therefore, appropriate design of the market where the customers can participate 
in the ILM programs is very important. The customers may choose to have a direct 
contract with the ISO or may opt to participate and offer its demand reduction 
directly in the spot market or in the balance market.  
 
C. Program Implementation 
 
Once the market for interruptible load has been established, it is important that the 
market can function efficiently and is fair to all participants. The issues related to 
implementation of the ILM program would include setting up of the information 
technology infrastructure to ensure timely information flow from the ISO or the 
utility to the various ILM participants, the installation of real-time meters at the 
customer-side to monitor that real-time interruption schedules are fulfilled and 
payment activities are coordinated. 
 
1.3.3 The Importance of Price-Responsive Demand 
 
It is desirable that the customers should have the opportunity to see electricity 
prices on a hour-to-hour basis, reflecting market price variations. This will 
improve the efficiency, increase reliability, and reduce the environmental impacts 
of electricity production.  
 
Customers who choose to face the volatility of electricity prices can lower their 
electricity bills as they can modify electricity usage in response to changing prices: 
i) by increasing usage during low-price periods, and ii) by cutting  down usage 
during high-price periods. Customers who modify their usage in response to price 
volatility help lower the size of price spikes.  
 
This demand-induced reduction in prices is a powerful way to mitigate the 
market power that some generators would otherwise have when demand is high 
and supplies tight. And these price-spike reductions are beneficial to all retail 
customers, not just those who modify their consumption in response to changing 
prices [5].  
 
Figure 1-6 shows the hypothetical demand and supply curves. The solid vertical 
line represents demand that is insensitive to price; the dashed line represents 
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demand that varies with price. For the latter case, the consumers responding to 
price (i.e., elastic demand) reduce the demand from Qinel to Qel and thus brings 
about a reduction in the price from Pinel to Pel (which is quite low if the price 
elasticity of demand is high).  
 
Pinel.
Pel.
Qinel.Qel.
Price
Supply or Demand
Supply
Inelastic Demand
Elastic Demand
 
Figure 1-6: Hypothetical demand and supply curve 
 
Customers who face real-time prices and respond to those prices provide 
valuable reliability services to the local control area. Reference [6] has noted that 
“to improve the reliability of electricity supply, some or all electric customers will 
have to be exposed to market prices”. Specifically, load reductions at times of high 
prices (generally caused by tight supplies) provide the same reliability benefits as 
the same amount of additional generating capacity (but at a lower cost). 
 
Finally, strategically timed demand reductions decrease the need to build new 
generation and transmission facilities. When demand responds to price, system 
load factors improve, increasing the utilization of existing generation and reducing 
the need to build new facilities. Deferring such construction may improve 
environmental quality. Cutting demand at times of high prices may also encourage 
the earlier retirement of aging an inefficient generating units. 
 
1.3.4 Interruptible Load versus Demand-side Management 
 
Demand-side management is the planning and implementation of the utility 
activities designed to influence customer use of electricity in ways that will 
produce desired long-term changes in the utility's load shape. Figure 1-7 shows 
different load shape objectives of demand-side management program. These 
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include: peak clipping, valley filling, load shifting, strategic conservation, strategic 
load growth and flexible load shape. 
 
Peak Clipping
Valey Filling
Load Shifting Flexible load shape
Strategic conservation
Strategic load growth
Demand-side
Management
 
Figure 1-7: Demand-side management objectives [7]
 
As described in the previous section, interruptible load program is an option  
within a demand-side management program that provides incentives to customers 
for reducing their power demand during the system peak load period or emergency 
conditions. 
1.3.5 Interruptible Load versus Fast-Startup Generator 
 
One may ask: "Is there any difference between interrupting a load and putting 
online a fast-startup generator (FSG)?". There are several differences: 
 
 The interruptible load can be available everywhere in the system, while 
the FSG can only be installed at limited locations. Hence, interruptible 
load provides the ISO with a wide range of selection in the network.  
 Besides providing active power reduction, interruptible load also provides 
the system with "free" reactive power relief. 
 FSG involves a large capital investment while that for interruptible load is 
much less. The utilities do, however, have to pay financial incentives to 
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the ILM participants. For a long-term plan, it would require a detailed 
economic analysis to clearly identify the cheaper option. 
 FSG has to run more than a "must-run" hours requirement, while the 
interruptible load can only be run within some specified hours.  
1.4 Objectives of the Thesis 
 
The study presented in this thesis attempts to: 
 
 Provide an understanding of the theoretical and practical aspects of 
interruptible load management in deregulated system operations; 
 Design a market for interruptible load customers who are willing to reduce 
their demand, as and when requested, in return of a financial 
compensation; 
 Examine the operational roles of interruptible load in cases of 
contingencies and demand spikes in the system; examine the market 
power of interruptible load bidders who take advantages of their strategic 
locations. 
 Provide an understanding of the theoretical and practical aspects of 
congestion management in deregulated system operations; 
 Examine the possibility of interruptible load in providing transmission 
congestion relief; 
 Carry out a cost-benefit analysis of long-term congestion management 
solution through the investment in reserve generation capacity and least-
cost investment in reserve services. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the interruptible load management within the 
context of deregulated electricity market. The importance and rationale for 
interruptible load services are presented. The objectives of this study toward 
resolving different existing issues related to operating of the interruptible load 
management program in the deregulated electricity market are presented 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the importance of operational roles of interruptible load 
management programs, namely, Direct Load Control; Dynamic Tariff/Pricing; 
Incentive Compatible Contract; Callable Forwards; Demand-Side Bidding; 
Specific ILM Markets; Priority Pricing. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the overall picture of the interruptible load management 
programs of various electric utilities, electricity markets and independent system 
operators around the world. The working mechanisms of interruptible load 
management programs and their effectiveness in aiding system operation in peak 
load periods and contingencies are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with optimal procurement of interruptible load services within 
secondary reserve ancillary service markets in deregulated power systems. The 
proposed model is based on an optimal power flow framework and can aid the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) in real-time selection of interruptible load 
offers. The structure of the market is also proposed for implementation. Various 
issues associated with procurement of interruptible load such as advance 
notification, locational aspect of load, power factor of the loads, are explicitly 
considered. It is shown that interruptible load market can help the ISO maintain 
operating reserves during peak load periods. Econometric analysis reveals that a 
close relationship exits between the reserve level and amount of interruptible load 
service invoked. It was also found that at certain buses, market power exists with 
the loads, and that could lead to unwanted inefficiencies in the market. Investing in 
generation capacity at such buses can mitigate this. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive review of utility practices as well as 
research methods in the area of transmission congestion management in 
deregulated electricity markets. It can be seen in the paper that many electricity 
markets are utilizing the methods which are widely addressed in the literature of 
the power engineering community. However, the methods used are widely 
different from one another as a result of different congestion management 
objectives in various electricity markets. 
 
Chapter 6 illustrates the role of interruptible load as a system service for 
transmission congestion management through the development of a Congestion 
Relief Model. The model is able to locationally identify the buses where corrective 
measures need to be taken for relieving congestion over a particular congested 
line. The N-1 contingency criterion has been taken into account to simulate various 
cases and hence examine the effectiveness of the proposed method. It has been 
shown that the method can assist the ISO to remove the overload from lines in 
both normal and contingency conditions in an optimal manner. 
 
Chapter 7 develops a framework for the evaluation of the long-term congestion 
management solution by the "fast-startup" gas-turbine generators based on the 
traditional cost-benefit analysis. This involves a planning exercise to determine the 
location and size of gas-turbine generators at different buses in the network such 
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that the total cost of investment in gas-turbine generators and the cost of system 
congestion are minimized. The second part of this chapter utilized the least-cost 
planning method in the evaluation of the investment of the "fast-startup" gas-
turbine generators in order to provide for reserve as well as congestion 
management ancillary services. In the first part, transmission congestion was used 
in the objective function, but not as a hard constraint, we experienced the problem 
that congestion was not totally removed. In the other method power flow 
constraints are introduced to completely remove the transmission congestion. 
 
Chapter 8 summarizes the main results of the present work and discusses future 
scope of work in interruptible load markets.  
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CHAPTER 2*
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD MANAGEMENT IN SYSTEM 
OPERATIONS 
 
This chapter addresses the importance of operational roles of an interruptible 
load management (ILM) program, with special emphasis on deregulated 
electricity markets. ILM programs have been classified into: Direct Load 
Control; Dynamic Tariff/Pricing; Incentive Compatible Contracts; Callable 
Forwards; Demand-Side Bidding; Specific ILM Markets; and Priority Pricing 
Mechanism. These are summarized in Figure 2-1: 
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Figure 2-1: Interruptible load management and its roles in system operations 
                                                     
* The work contained in this chapter has been published in the following paper: 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya, "A Review on Interruptible Load Management: Literature and 
Practice", in Proc. of 33rd North American Power Symposium, Texas, USA, October 15-
16, 2001, pp. 406-413. 
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2.1 Interruptible Load Management in System Operation 
 
In order to be an effective means of managing peak load by the utility/ISO, an 
ILM program must adequately address the following issues [1]: 
 
1. What are the short-term discounts in prices (in $/MWh) to be offered to the 
customers participating in the ILM program? 
2. What are the longer-term benefits to be given to the customers in terms of 
reduction in demand charges (in $/MW) for the part of the demand subscribed 
to ILM? 
3. How does the utility select different types of interruptible load in real-time 
taking into account the following considerations: 
 advance notification for load curtailment: one hour, one day, one week. 
 duration of curtailment: curtailment limited to peak hour only, or longer 
period curtailment by shifting load to off-peak hours. 
 nature of load and cost associated with load curtailment: low power factor 
with lower cost of curtailment. 
 generation and network characteristics: spatial demand and generating 
sources, limits on generation output, ramp rate, voltage, or line flows. 
 system security: to ensure that the system can "survive" a specified list of 
contingencies, i.e., the emergency limits on voltage and line flow limits 
are not exceeded for certain line, bus or generator outage combinations. 
 
A study on system peak demand reduction due to different load control 
programs in the case of the Taiwan power system was presented by Chen and Leu 
[2]. The avoided-cost of capacity addition for the utility and appropriate incentive 
rate structures to the customers were discussed in the paper. 
 
Impact of load management on short-term operating benefit was addressed in 
[3]. It was shown in the paper that the interruptible load program resulted in great 
cost saving in terms of reducing the total societal cost (system operating cost and 
customer interruption cost) of electricity.  
 
The role of interruptible load in providing supplemental operating reserve to the 
system was studied in [4]-[9], where a number of techniques are presented to 
include interruptible load in the probabilistic assessment of the level of system 
operating reserve. An adequate operating reserve is required in an electric power 
system in order to maintain a desired level of reliability throughout a given period 
of time. Interruptible load can be considered as part of the system operating 
 16 
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
 
reserve if required. The inclusion of interruptible load in the assessment of unit 
commitment in interconnected systems was demonstrated in [6] and of economic 
load dispatch of generation systems in [7].  
 
An optimal power flow framework developed by Majumdar et al. [1] addressed 
issues of advance notification for load curtailment as well as short- and long-term 
price discounts on demand charges. It was shown in [10] that the interruptible 
tariff mechanism would be able to aid system operation during peak load periods, 
such as increased reliability margins, improving voltage profiles as well as 
relieving network congestion. A mathematical model was developed to express the 
response of customers to incentives offered by the utility and the OPF framework 
was modified to incorporate various utility-customer interactions while 
determining the optimal incentives. 
 
Caramanis et al. [11] worked out a comprehensive pricing formulation for 
interruptible loads and assignment of power pool reserves. It was shown that 
optimal pricing mechanisms did exist, and these invoked customer participation in 
a socially optimum manner to aid in system operation and provide for system 
security. Consequently, it was shown by Kaye et al. [12] that system security 
could be maintained in an operating environment where all participants (including 
those on the supply-side and those on the demand-side) sought to optimize their 
own benefits through pricing mechanisms. A generalized model for the inclusion 
of security constraints in competitive markets was developed in [13] where the 
prices are determined by considering customer demand-price elasticity. 
 
The role of demand elasticity in congestion management and pricing in a 
competitive electricity market was investigated in [14]. The actions of price 
responsive loads could be represented in terms of the customers' willingness-to-
pay. From each customer's demand curve, the elasticity of the load at different 
prices is known and the benefit function is derived. The load at each bus ceases to 
be a fixed quantity and becomes a decision variable in the ISO's optimization 
problem. In this way, the ISO has additional degrees of freedom in determining 
necessary actions for network congestion management. 
As the electric power industry moved towards deregulation and competition, the 
generating capacity margins available to the system operators have been reducing 
drastically. There is an emerging question as to “Who should be responsible for 
generation capacity addition?”, explicitly addressed in Söder [15], at least for the 
case of the Swedish deregulated electricity market. It was suggested that one of the 
possible measures would be to develop a market for voluntary demand reduction, 
i.e., the interruptible load market, where the customers would be compensated for 
the costs of electricity service interruption. 
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2.2 ILM Programs, Mechanisms, and Markets 
 
A number of methods for designing optimal working mechanisms for interruptible 
load participation has been proposed in the research literature. These can be 
divided into several groups, namely direct load control, dynamic/interruptible 
tariff, incentive compatible contracts, callable forwards, demand-side bidding, 
specific ILM markets, and priority pricing mechanism. We briefly discuss them in 
the following subsections. 
 
2.2.1 Direct Load Control 
 
The amount of system peak load reduction through scheduling of control periods 
in commercial/industrial and residential load control programs at Florida Power 
and Light Company have been calculated using a linear programming (LP) 
optimization model [16]. The LP model can be used to determine both long- and 
short-term control scheduling strategies and for planning the number of customers 
that should be enrolled in each program. Similarly, a profit-based load 
management program was introduced in [17] to examine generic direct load 
control scheduling. Based upon the cost/market-price function, the approach aims 
to increase the profit of utilities. Instead of determining the amount of energy to be 
deferred or to be paid back, the algorithm controls the number of groups per 
customer/load type to maximize the profit.  
 
The direct load control problem of air conditioner loads (ACLs) was addressed 
using a fuzzy dynamic programming approach developed in [18]. The interrupted 
capacities of the ACLs and the system load demands are all regarded as fuzzy 
variables. The scheduling of directly controlled loads and the unit commitment are 
integrated into the fuzzy dynamic programming structure to reduce the system 
peak load as well as total operating costs. Genetic algorithm has been applied to 
scheduling of direct load controls in [19]. The control strategy (or scheduling) 
arranged by the recursive genetic algorithm not only sheds the load so that the load 
required to be shed at each sampling interval is individually satisfied, but also 
minimizes the load shed in order to minimize the utility's revenue loss due to 
direct load control. 
 
2.2.2 Dynamic Tariff/Pricing 
 
Among some works on interruptible load and tariffs, the need and the role of 
dynamic pricing options in achieving utility demand management objectives with 
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reference to some of the existing interruptible load management options in 
different countries were discussed by Shangvi [20].  
 
A consumer behavior model was proposed by David et al. [21], [22], 
incorporating demand elasticity across time, degree of consumer rationality and 
the supply-side information, and information on the price formation model. The 
behavior model serves as load management tools as it could help to predict how 
consumers would respond to the magnitude and variation of electricity price. 
 
Spot pricing of electricity embodies a unified approach to multiple goals of 
demand-side management by reflecting the time varying nature of the cost of 
electricity supply. The customer's response to spot prices was discussed in [23], 
[24]. The attributes that enabled flexible customer response without service 
curtailments were identified and optimal behavior of industrial customers under 
spot pricing mechanism was examined in [23]. It also showed that there would be 
a potential for cost savings associated with spot pricing as compared to those 
associated with flat rate pricing. An integrated theory of consumer response 
models and system price forecasting under dynamic conditions created by 
dynamic pricing was introduced in [24]. 
 
Different structures of ILM programs and their effects on system peak demand 
reduction in the case of Taiwan power system were presented in [2]. Three 
alternative incentive rates based on avoided-cost were designed for interruptible 
load programs. Among these, one was actually activated by Taiwan Power 
Company (Taipower) in 1987, when some preliminary results were obtained.  
 
The design of the optimal interruptible load contract was attempted in [25] by 
using the mechanism design. It was shown that the so designed contract would 
give the customers enough incentive to sign up voluntarily for the right contract 
and reveal their true value of power. The paper suggested that it would not be 
necessary for a utility to know in advance the type of customer it faced when 
designing such programs. The paper illustrated and incorporated the importance of 
load location into the process. Another paper of similar nature [26] attempted to 
formulate various incentive-responsive demand management programs 
considering social (utility and customer) optimality, which could help electric 
utilities to reduce transmission bottlenecks and increase the safety margin of 
power systems.  
It was shown in [27] that the available data on current demand management 
contracts could be used to calibrate the customer cost function and help design 
better demand management contracts. It was also shown that the key to have 
efficient demand management contracts would be by having a good estimate of the 
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customer outage cost function. If the estimated cost function is correct, utilities 
can optimize the compensation they offer in return for load curtailment.  
2.2.3 Callable Forwards 
 
In the context of deregulation, a market for interruptible load (callable forwards), 
which is continuously tradable until the time of use, was proposed by Gedra and 
Varaiya [28]. The equivalence between interruptible service contracts and forward 
contracts bundled with a call option was discussed in detail. In a competitive 
market, customers wishing to ensure a fixed electricity price while taking 
advantage of their flexibility to curtail loads can do so by purchasing a forward 
electricity contract bundled with a financial option that provides a hedge against 
price risk and reflects the real options available to the customers. This financial 
instrument was referred to as a double-call option [29]. It was shown that a 
forward contract bundled with an appropriate double-call option would provide a 
perfect hedge for customers that could curtail loads in response to high spot prices 
and could mitigate their curtailment losses when the curtailment decision was 
made with sufficient lead-time. 
 
2.2.4 Demand-Side Bidding (DSB) 
 
A framework for the incorporation of demand-side participation in a competitive 
electricity market was introduced by Strabac et al. [30]. This framework can be 
used for comprehensive evaluation of possible scenarios for the implementation of 
DSB into the electricity market as well as for the assessment of the influence of 
DSB on total production costs, system marginal price, capacity payment, etc.  
 
It was argued in [31] that in a competitive electricity pool, highly flexible forms 
of generation and load reduction could cause sharp and unwarranted increases in 
electricity prices if the production schedule would be based on minimization of the 
total scheduled costs. Such pools are therefore vulnerable to price manipulations 
by generating companies owning a portfolio of generating units or controlling 
some demand-side bidding. It was also argued that the competitiveness of 
demand-side bidding would be artificially inflated if the load recovery periods, 
which invariably accompany load reductions, were not taken into consideration 
when establishing the generation schedule. 
 
The behavior of DSB auctions in the power pool framework, using the 24-hour 
unit commitment model, in which both supply and demand bids are equally 
treated, was studied in [32]. The customers are allowed to participate in the market 
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by submitting the bid for the reduction in their demand during the system peak 
periods or during times of contingencies. The market prices are determined at the 
point where the aggregate supply bids and demand bids intersect. The model also 
takes into account the load recovery characteristics after the interruption. It was 
shown that DSB would be able to mitigate the potential for exercise of market 
power by the supply-side bidders and DSB would help smoothen the system 
marginal prices and mitigate price volatility.  
 
A method to build optimal bidding strategies for both power suppliers and large 
customers in a pool-co type electricity market was presented in [33] using a 
stochastic optimization model. It is assumed in the paper that each 
supplier/customer bids a linear supply/demand function, and the system is 
dispatched to maximize the social welfare. Each supplier/customer chooses the 
coefficients in the linear supply/demand function to maximize benefits, subject to 
expectations about how rival participants will bid. 
 
2.2.5 Specific ILM Markets 
 
It was suggested by Hirst and Kirby [34] that electric customers, i.e., the load, 
would participate directly in the wholesale competitive market to improve 
economic efficiency, increase reliability and reduce environmental impacts of 
electricity production. It was also suggested that, ultimately, competitive 
electricity markets would feature two kinds of demand-response programs. First, 
some customers would choose to face electricity prices that vary from hour to 
hour. Typically, these prices will be established in the day-ahead markets run by 
regional transmission organizations. Second, some customers would select fixed 
prices, as they had in the past, but voluntarily cut demand during periods of very 
high prices. In the second option, the customer and the electricity supplier would 
share the savings associated with such load reductions. 
 
In deregulated electricity markets, the ISO has an overall responsibility of 
providing and procuring various services that are essential for the maintenance of 
system security and reliability. Such services have been referred to as ancillary 
services. According to the North America Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
Operating Policy-10 [35], interruptible load management (ILM) is recognized as 
one of the contingency reserve services. Similarly, the Australian electricity 
market recognizes "load shedding", both as a frequency control service and a 
network loading control ancillary service [36]. The Swedish ISO (Svenska 
Krafnät) also recognizes ILM as an ancillary service, though there is no 
established financial compensation scheme in place yet. Interruptible load can 
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participate in the reserve markets and it was shown in [5] that it would have the 
same net effect as reserve generation, that they provide a means of maintaining the 
balance of supply and demand in the event of a failure in the system. It was shown 
by  Kirby and Hirst [37] that load would be considered as a resource in providing 
ancillary services. In [38], the design of a market for interruptible loads within the 
secondary reserve ancillary service was proposed and proved to function well. The 
locational aspect of interruptible load offers was incorporated in the market 
operation through marginal loss coefficients at every load bus. The paper also 
attempted to incorporate the behavior of the interruptible load offers with respect 
to the information on system operating reserve forecast.  
 
2.2.6 Priority Pricing Mechanism 
 
Priority pricing of interruptible electric service induces each customer to self-
select a rationing priority that matches the order of its interruption loss. A tariff 
structure (with subject to minimization of total expected customers interruption 
cost) proposed in [39] allowed a customer to choose either early notification and 
pay a fixed fee, or select no advance notification along with a level of 
compensation when interrupted. The chosen compensation determines customer 
service priority and corresponding price.  
 
In the event of shortage in generating capacity, it is obviously inefficient if the 
electricity utility cuts off customers randomly. It is preferable to set up a market in 
service priority in which customers who have a greater need pay more for the right 
not to be cut off. An econometric model of outage costs in Israel was used to 
calculate the menu of priority rates by season and time of day. Top priority rates 
range from zero, when the loss-of-load probability (LOLP) is zero, to 8 cents (US) 
per kWh when the LOLP is highest [40]. 
 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presents a systematic review on recent research trends in the issues 
related to interruptible load management. It should be noted that depending on the 
structure of the electricity market and the perception of the customer, appropriate 
interruptible load contracts must be designed to attract customer's participation in 
ILM schemes so as to maximize the overall economic efficiency. It has been 
shown that ILM would be a cost-saving opportunity for the peak load capacity 
problem, especially in the deregulated electricity markets. 
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CHAPTER 3*
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD MANAGEMENT: A GLOBAL 
PICTURE 
 
International experiences on ILM practiced by various electric utilities, electricity 
markets, independent system operators (ISOs) around the world (i.e., Alberta, 
England and Wales, California, Australia, New England, New York, New 
Zealand, Sweden and Taiwan) are presented. The working mechanisms of ILM as 
implemented by those utilities/markets and their effectiveness in aiding system 
operation in peak load periods and contingencies are discussed. 
3.1 Alberta Power Pool 
 
The Alberta power pool in Canada has a curtailable load program so as to enhance 
the system security of the Alberta Interconnected Electric System operations. 
Customers willing to participate in the program need to offer at least 1MW of their 
load as curtailable load. There is also a requirement for time-of-use metering 
equipment and the customer’s ability to receive dispatch instructions from the pool 
when required. Customers need to submit their offers in terms of the curtailable 
MW and the associated price. Based on the offers received by the pool, the pool 
operator determines the contracted curtailable customers, by classifying them 
either as Type-1 or Type-2. The details of these two Types are summarized in the 
Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1: Curtailable load program - Alberta [1]
Name Contract 
type 
Advance 
notification 
Minimum 
curtailment 
Payment structure 
Type-1 1-month 
contract 
1 hour 1 MW, up to 4 
hours 
fixed price per MW per month 
independent of the number of 
interruptions requested 
Type-2 weekly 
contract 
1 hour 1 MW, up to 4 
hours 
price per MWh and suppliers 
are paid only when they are 
dispatched. 
                                                     
* The work contained in this chapter has been published in the following paper: 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya, "A Review on Interruptible Load Management: Literature and 
Practice", in Proc. of 33rd North American Power Symposium, Texas, USA, October 15-
16, 2001, pp. 406-413. 
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Offers are ranked in order of their prices, from lowest to highest. The pool 
operator selects the offers starting from the lowest price till it meets the 
curtailment quantity requirement. 
3.2 Demand Relief Program of California ISO (Cal-ISO) 
 
Cal-ISO has initiated a demand relief program (DRP) in which the customer signs 
a contract with the ISO for its demand reduction. The ISO implements the 
program as a means of providing incentives to induce customers to reduce their 
demand during times of resource shortage. The payments are based on monthly 
capacity reservation, which is preset by the ISO, and then there are payments for 
the energy actually disconnected. The customer must be able to reduce at least 1 
MW of load demand. The ISO and contracted load enters into the contract. The 
contracts are different for loads with and without backup generators (BUG). The 
summary of the contract types is shown in Table 3-2.  
 
Table 3-2: Demand relief program - Cal-ISO [2]
Name Contract 
type 
Advance 
notification 
Minimum 
curtailment 
When called 
upon 
Payment 
structure 
Without   
BUG 
offer for 
interruption 
call first, 30 
minutes 
1 MW, up to 
4 hours 
emergency 
reserve less 
than 5% 
With 
BUG 
offer for 
interruption 
call second, 
15 minutes 
1 MW, up to 
4 hours 
 
emergency 
reserve less 
than 2% 
 
- monthly 
capacity 
reservation 
payment 
- payment 
for energy 
actually 
disconnected 
 
According to an evaluation of the DRP in 2000 [3], 269 MW of loads was 
received and evaluated. The average capacity price for the accepted offers to the 
DRP was about $36,000 per MW-month. The average energy price was $226 per 
MWh. 
 
3.3 Demand-side Bidding Mechanism in the UK 
 
Within the trading arrangements of the UK power pool, demand-side bidding was 
introduced in December 1993 and has since then operated as a demand reduction 
scheme. In this way, the demand-side bidders are deemed to have a more 
beneficial effect by reducing demand by a pre-defined amount rather than by an 
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unknown amount. The participants must offer at least 10 MW of their load for 
curtailment and have a potential for 50 GWh demand reduction over a year. 
Demand-side bidders are expected to abide by the demand reduction schedules, or 
if no schedule is received, when the system marginal price is equal or higher than 
the bid price of the relevant reducible demand. 
 
The payment structure for demand-side bidding is as follows: 
 Demand-side bidders pay at Pool Selling Price for all demand actually 
taken, independent of whether it was offered as being reducible. 
 Demand-side bidders receives an Availability Payment, when there is a 
value, for all demand offered available for reduction, that is not scheduled 
in the unconstrained schedule. 
 
The intent behind the scheme is to schedule, when cost-efficient, any demand 
reduction submitted by participants as available for reduction in a similar manner 
as generating units. The scheme is implemented as follows: The demand-side 
bidders bid within their fully expected demand for each half-hour of the next day, 
offer reducible availability, which is the demand available for reduction and the 
market price above which, the demand will be reduced. The pool operator resolves 
the market incorporating the demand bids that are scheduled in the unconstrained 
market settlement in the same manner as scheduling a generating unit. Within one 
hour of the publication of the system marginal price, the demand-side bidder will 
receive notification of demand reduction scheduled for the next day. In the event 
that there is no demand scheduled for reduction, then whenever the value of the 
marginal price equals or exceeds the bid price, participants are required to reduce 
demand [4]. 
 
3.4 NEMMCO (Australia) 
 
The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO), which is the 
ISO in Australia, allows for demand-side bidding in the market. However the rules 
and codes are not very attractive to the customers. So far, only a few large 
customers and pump-storage hydro power plants are participating. Customers can 
register as scheduled loads and can submit their dispatch bids to the NEMMCO. 
Both generators and customers are centrally dispatched. The dispatch bid can be 
specified so as to increase or decrease the load if the price is below or above the 
pre-specified level. The Australian National Electricity Code Administration is 
taking initiatives to change the rules to introduce more attractive arrangements for 
demand side bidding [5]. 
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3.5 NE-ISO 
 
New England’s demand response programs are aimed at reducing electricity 
consumption, particularly during periods of high demand when prices are highest. 
ISO New England’s demand response efforts are designed to increase system 
reliability, mitigate extreme price volatility, and increase the market’s response to 
price signal. Demand response participants are paid monthly capacity payment and 
energy payment for the demand reduction they offer.  ISO New England (ISO-NE) 
introduced several demand response programs on March 1, 2003. The new 
programs, that replaced the existing ISO-NE offerings that had been available 
since 2001, were organized into two categories, as follows [6]: 
 
 Programs that provide reliability, the Real-Time Demand Response 
Program and the Real-Time Profiled Response Program, and 
 Programs designed to encourage load reduction in response to high real-
time wholesale energy prices, which currently includes the Real-Time 
Price Response Program. 
 
Table 3-3 presents a summary of the demand response programs currently 
available at ISO New England. According to [6], participation in both the price 
and demand response programs peaked in August of 2003, with 332 and 106 
enrolled assets (participants), respectively. Load subscribed in the demand 
program increased from about 50 MW in March to about 240 MW by summer’s 
start and peaked at 261 MW in July 2003. Price program load  enrollments were at 
their highest in March 2003  with 136 MW, and after a spring-time decline, grew 
to in excess of 100 MW in July 2003 and reached the summer peak of 130 MW in 
August 2003. 
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Table 3-3: NE-ISO Demand Response Programs - Summary 
 Reliability Based Price Based 
Program Name 
 
Real time demand 
response 
 
Real time profile 
Response 
 
Real time price 
response 
 
Customer Type  
 
Individual 
 
Group 
 
Individual 
 
Minimum 
Reduction 
100 kW 
 
200 kW 
 
100 kW 
 
Notification 
 
Respond to ISO 
Control Room 
request 
 
Respond to ISO 
Control 
Room request 
 
Prices are forecasted 
to 
Exceed $0.10/kWh 
either the night 
before or during the 
event day. 
Response Time 
 
Within 30-Minutes 
or 2-Hours of ISO 
request. Customer 
must elect option 
when applying. 
Within 2-Hours of 
ISO 
Request 
 
Voluntary. 
Customer decides 
when and for how 
long. 
 
Energy Payment 
Rate 
and Terms 
 
Greater of Real Time 
Price or Guaranteed 
Minimum 
$0.50/kWh for 30-
Minute Response 
and $0.35/kWh for 
2-Hour Response. 
Greater of Real 
Time Price 
Or Guaranteed 
Minimum 
$0.10/kWh 
 
Greater of Real 
Time Price or 
Guaranteed 
Minimum of 
$0.10/kWh 
 
Duration of 
Demand 
Response Event 
 
Minimum 2-Hour 
guaranteed 
interruption 
 
Minimum 2-Hour 
guaranteed 
Interruption 
 
Price response 
“window” open as 
early as 7:00 AM 
and remains open 
until 6:00 PM 
Monthly 
Capacity 
Payment ($/kW) 
Yes 
 
Yes No 
Metering 
Requirement 
 
5-Minute Data via 
internet Based 
Communication 
System  
Performance 
determined 
Through Statistical 
Analysis 
Hourly Data 
submitted either 
Daily or Monthly 
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3.6 New York ISO 
 
There is a provision for customers to offer interruptible load service to a Load 
Serving Entity (LSE) within the New York ISO (NYISO) and thereby provide 
additional operating reserve to the latter. They may enter into contracts with LSE 
for compensation. But in order to participate in the day-ahead or operating reserve 
market, customers must contract their interruptible load with NYISO directly, 
thereby allowing direct control, monitoring and billing by the latter. The offers 
must be larger than 1MW, the response time must be less than 10 minutes and the 
duration can be up to 1 hour. Interruptible loads are classified into several types: 
 With non-price capped fixed energy: Load that schedules non-price 
sensitive energy (i.e. a fixed MWh level with no price cap), and then 
offers to interrupt that load to reduce the demand 
 With price-capped energy: Load that schedules day-ahead price-sensitive 
energy, and then offers to interrupt that load to reduce the demand. 
 
There is a provision for 10-minute and 30-minute spinning reserve markets in 
NYISO wherein interruptible and/or dispatchable load resources located within the 
NYISO and synchronized to the system can offer to participate. In such cases, they 
would need to respond to the ISO instructions for load curtailment within 10-
minute or 30-minute time-frames, as applicable. The offers in these markets can be 
for 2 MW or 1 MW of synchronized load at each hour and the NYISO schedules 
for both 2 MW load and 1 MW 10-minute spinning reserve for each hour. The 2 
MW loads are paid for each hour at day-ahead energy price while the 1 MW loads 
are paid the 10-minute spinning reserve market-clearing price for each hour [7], 
[8]. 
 
3.7 New Zealand - The M-Co 
M-co was formed in 1993 as EMCO (the Electricity Market Company) 
specifically to develop, implement and operate New Zealand's wholesale market 
for trading electricity. Today, M-co remains at the forefront of positive change 
within that industry, and continues to increase efficiency and reduce transaction 
costs for electricity industry participants.  
 
New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) was established as a market for both 
purchasers and generators. However, market participants have identified that more 
can be done to deliver the purchaser, or demand-side, participation to its fullest 
potential.  
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The Demand-side Participation sub-group of the Market Pricing Working Group 
(MPWG) examined which areas of NZEM could further enhance the accuracy and 
economic efficiency of the price signal. The group believes this will improve the 
prospects of demand side participation.  
Demand-side bidding is allowed in the market by the market settlement rules. 
However, only some embedded generators are bidding in the market. Recently the 
Market Pricing Working Group has proposed some recommendations to promote 
demand-side bidding [9]: 
 Appropriate and timely price signals are a key to demand side 
participation 
 Self-dispatch in response to price signals is the most appropriate means 
of encouraging efficient demand-side participation 
 Demand-side should have greater freedom to self-dispatch in response to 
a price signal 
 Final price should be published as close as possible to real time, as 
widely as possible 
 Lowering fixed fees in NZEM to encourage a higher level of direct 
demand side membership 
3.8 Sweden 
 
Since 1 January 1996, Svenska Kraftnät has been designated as the authority with 
system responsibility. By law, Svenska Kraftnät has been given the power to issue 
direct orders to producers to increase and decrease production rapidly in order to 
keep the balance of the system. Svenska Kraftnät can also issue orders to decrease 
electricity consumption. It has also been given the right to stipulate the technical 
requirements and the reliability requirements for production plants and networks. 
 
Svenska Kraftnät is responsible for metering and final settlement at the national 
grid level. All electricity supply companies have to be connected to the system of 
metering and final settlement for balancing by Svenska Kraftnät. Svenska Kraftnät 
has also been designated as the exclusive grid-responsible entity in Sweden 
according to the Transit Directive [10]. 
 
In Sweden, interruptible load management is considered as an important solution 
for the peak load capacity shortage problem. Swedish ISO (Svenska Kraftnät) as 
well as other energy authorities are trying to find the optimal mechanism to 
allow/encourage the customers to participate in the spot market for the change in 
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their electricity demand. The ISO encourages suppliers and customers to reach 
mutual agreements on how to enable the interruptible load program. The objective 
is to bring the interruptible load into the market. The ISO recently signed an 
interruptible load contract with one big industry as part of its ancillary services. As 
it stands, the spot market in Sweden (Nordpool) is of double-auction type and 
could well fit in interruptible load offers (or demand-side bidding) [11]. 
3.9 Taiwan 
 
Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) is a state-owned utility company and 
provides the electricity in Taiwan. With high load growth and delays in  new 
generation capacity addition due to environmental regulations, the system spinning 
reserve has been reduced to a low level. Load sheddings had to be implemented 
when a large unit tripped during the summer peak period and a significant 
economic loss was incurred [12]. 
 
Taipower has successfully implemented an interruptible load control program, as 
shown in Table 3-4. 
 
Table 3-4: Interruptible load programs - Taipower 
Name Contract 
type 
Advance 
notifica-
tion 
Minimum curtailment Payment structure 
Strategy A 
 
contract 1 day, 1 
week 
industrial customers, 
5 MW, 6 hours per 
day 
 
contracted demand is 
charged with 50% 
discount price 
Strategy B contract 1 day, 4 
hours, 1 
hour 
all industrial 
customers, up to 6 
hours per 
interruption, less than 
100 hours a year 
depending on advance 
notification time 
Note: Strategy A was actually implemented in 1987 
 
The results showed that with the strategy A, customers participated in the 
program and reduced the system peak load significantly. The system peak was 
decreased by 2.44% of the total peak demand. The potential effect of ILM with 
strategy B was also investigated [12]. It showed that there would be a dramatic 
increase of potential for interruptible load service if the discount rate was 
increased from 30% to 50%, and more peak load reduction would be exercised if 
the advance notification time was increased. 
 34 
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
3.10 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presents an overview of how interruptible load management schemes 
have been working in some of the deregulated electricity markets around the 
world. A summary of these schemes is presented in Table 3-5.  
It can be seen from Table 3-5 that in all the systems discussed, ILM has either 
been a direct contract with the ISO/load serving entity or direct bidding into the 
pool market. In the case of New York ISO, the ILM can also participate in the 10-
minute spinning reserve market. The advance notification time required varies 
from 10 minutes to 1 day. The incentive schemes include reduced electricity price; 
fixed payment per MW per month; and price per MWh of energy actually 
disconnected. 
 
It should be noted that depending on the structure of the electricity market and 
the perception of customer, appropriate interruptible load contracts must be 
designed to attract customer's participation in ILM scheme to maximize the overall 
economic efficiency. It is realized that in some markets, ILM has been 
successfully implemented, while in other markets, it is still in development phase. 
Similar to our  conclusions from the previous chapter, the review of utility 
practices have also shown that ILM would be a cost-saving opportunity for the 
peak load capacity problem, especially in the deregulated electricity markets. 
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Table 3-5: Interruptible load programs in selected markets: A summary 
Name Contract 
type 
Advance 
notification 
Minimum 
curtailment 
Payment structure 
Alberta     
Type-1 1 month 
contract 
1 hour 1 MW, up to 4 
hours 
fixed price per MW per 
month independent of the 
number of interruptions 
requested 
Type-2 weekly 
contract 
1 hour 1 MW, up to 4 
hours 
price per MWh and 
suppliers are paid only 
when they are dispatched 
Cal-ISO     
With BUG  Call second, 
15 minutes 
1 MW, up to 4 
hours 
Without   
BUG 
 
 Call first, 30 
minutes 
1 MW, up to 4 
hours 
- monthly capacity 
reservation payment 
- payment for energy 
actually delivered 
United 
Kingdom 
bid in 
pool 
1 day  10 MW, 50 
GWh per year 
- pay pool selling price 
- paid availability payment 
Australia bid in 
pool 
1 day large customers not yet developed 
New 
England 
contract 30 minutes 
or 2 hours 
100 kW, 200 
kW 
- monthly capacity 
payment 
- energy payment: greater 
of real-time price or 
guarantee minimum prices 
New York contract  10 minute 1 MW and 2 
MW, up to 1 
hour 
1 MW paid 10-minute 
spinning reserve market 
price 
2 MW paid day-ahead 
market clearing price 
New 
Zealand 
under 
develop-
ment 
under 
development 
under 
development 
under development 
Sweden under 
develop-
ment 
under 
development 
under 
development 
under development 
Taiwan     
Strategy A contract 1 day, 1 
week 
5 MW, 6 hours 
per day 
contracted demand is 
charged with 50% discount 
price 
Strategy B contract 1 day, 4 
hours, 1 
hours 
all industrial 
customers, up to 
6 hours per 
interruption 
depending on advance 
notification time 
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CHAPTER 4*
THE DESIGN OF INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD SERVICE 
MARKETS 
 
This chapter deals with optimal procurement of interruptible load services within 
secondary reserve ancillary service markets in deregulated power systems. The 
proposed model is based on an optimal power flow framework and can aid the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) in real-time selection of interruptible load 
offers. The structure of the market is also proposed for implementation. Various 
issues associated with procurement of interruptible load such as advance 
notification, locational aspect of load, power factor of the loads, are explicitly 
considered. It is shown that interruptible load market can help the ISO maintain 
operating reserves during peak load periods. Econometric analysis reveals that a 
close relationship exits between the reserve level and amount of interruptible load 
service invoked. It was also found that at certain buses, market power exists with 
the loads, and that could lead to unwanted inefficiencies in the market. Investing 
in generation capacity at such buses can mitigate this. The CIGRE 32-bus system 
appropriately modified to include various customer characteristics is used for the 
study. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As described in Chapter 3, in deregulated electricity markets, the ISO has the 
overall responsibility of providing and procuring various services that are essential 
for the maintenance of system security and reliability. Such services are referred to 
as ancillary services. According to the North America Electricity Reliability 
Council (NERC) Operating Policy-10 [1], interruptible load management (ILM) is 
recognized as one of the contingency reserve services. Similarly, the Australian 
electricity market recognizes "load shedding", both as a frequency control service 
and a network loading control ancillary service [2]. The Swedish ISO (Svenska 
                                                     
* The work contained in this chapter has been published in the following papers: 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya, "Interruptible Load Management Within Secondary Reserve 
Ancillary Service Market", in Proc. of IEEE Porto PowerTech'2001 Conference, Vol. 1, 
Porto, Portugal, September 10-13, 2001. 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya, "Competitive Framework for Procurement of Interruptible 
Load Services", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 18, No. 2, May 2003, pp. 889-
897. 
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Krafnät) also recognizes ILM as an ancillary service and is in the process of 
establishing a proper framework for its functioning. 
We have also seen from our reviews in Chapters 2 and 3 that it has been 
generally accepted that ILM has an important role to play as system ancillary 
services, particularly as contingency reserve services. It is more so, since the 
operating margins available to the ISO have been reducing drastically with 
increasing market competition.  
Contrary to pool markets, where generation sell offers and customers buy bids 
are treated simultaneously within the scheduling program by the pool operator, 
bilateral contract dominated markets have a different scenario. In bilateral contract 
dominated markets, the ISO has no say over generation scheduling or unit 
commitment decisions (for example, Sweden). The generating companies can 
enter into direct contracts with customers that can be days, weeks, or even months 
in advance. The ISO is only informed about these transactions to take place on a 
given day and hour. It is the responsibility of the ISO to meet these transactions 
while satisfying system constraints. In such markets, interruptible load options are 
therefore required to be handled by the ISO independently as an ancillary service. 
In this chapter, we developed a framework for a competitive market for 
interruptible load services. Customers participating in this market shall submit to 
the ISO their offers for load reduction (in MW) along with the desired price for 
such a service (in $/MWh). The ISO settles the market and determine the optimal 
set of contracts and the uniform market price. The attractiveness of this market is 
that, although it is independent of the real power market, it responds to price and 
demand fluctuations in the real power market. 
The work is an extension of [3], wherein optimal interruptible tariffs were 
worked out for a vertically integrated electric utility. The optimal incentives were 
determined based on maximization of the utility's social welfare. The present 
work, on the other hand, introduces a competitive framework and proposes a 
uniform price based market settlement model using participant bids. It also 
incorporates market imperfection arising from system conditions dependent 
participants' bidding strategies. 
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4.2 Design of Interruptible Load Markets 
4.2.1 Market Structure 
 
Ideally, the ISO's objective while formulating the optimal contracts would be to 
seek those customers offering the lowest price. However, such a selection, without 
taking into account the system and load flow pattern, may give rise to transmission 
congestion, increased system losses, increased reactive support requirements, etc. 
This may happen, since, choosing to interrupt a low-priced offer load located at a 
remote area may increase the system power flows in an undesirable manner. Thus, 
a location-dependent parameter to re-value the customer price offers is introduced. 
Using the re-valued offer prices, the ISO obtains the optimal interruptible load 
contracts while satisfying all system constraints. 
 
An OPF based framework has been used to model the above features of the 
interruptible load market, customers offers, locational aspects in their offers and 
the final optimal contracting decisions of the ISO. The OPF model is suitably 
modified to incorporate the above aspects, while also satisfying the usual system 
constraints such as bus voltage limits, reactive power support limits, etc.  
 
A schematic diagram of the proposed interruptible load market structure 
operated by the ISO is shown in Figure 4-1. The time frame of market operation is 
also shown in the figure. The ISO who is responsible for operation of the 
interruptible load market shall call for offers for load interruption on an hour-to-
hour basis. The participants submit their offers to the ISO for hour k at hour k-1. 
The ISO has also received, in advance, information on unit commitment schedules 
from independent generators. Based on these, it evaluates the offers and 
determines the optimal selection of interruptible loads as per its requirement and 
that is when the interruptible load market is cleared. The selected interruptible 
loads can expect to be called upon, when necessary, during the next hour (i.e., 
between hour k and hour k+1). The market participants submit their offers 
specifying the price β (in $/MWh) for energy to be interrupted and the quantity of 
interruptible load μ (in MW). 
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Figure 4-1:  Schematic representation of the proposed interruptible load market 
operation 
 
4.2.2 Optimum Procurement of Interruptible Load Services 
 
Procurement of interruptible load services needs to be carried out by the ISO while 
addressing the following issues: 
 
 The secondary reserve service cost (SRC), defined as the total payment to 
interruptible load customers less the benefits accrued to the system from load 
interruption, is minimized. 
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 It is not desirable to increase the ISO's burden on procurement of other 
services such as loss compensation or reactive power services through 
increased losses. Thus, procurement of interruptible load services should seek 
to minimize system losses. 
 Mandatory requirement of maintaining the specified amount of system 
contingency reserve is satisfied. 
 All operating constraints of the system are satisfied. 
 
The procurement scheme proposed in this chapter works in two steps, the first 
step evaluates the worth of an interruptible load in terms of its location in the 
system, and in the second step, the information from the first is incorporated to 
obtain the optimal decision: 
 Step-I, (Base-OPF): Obtain OPF solution by minimizing total system losses, and 
hence determine the marginal loss coefficients λi at each bus i. The value of λ 
(p.u.MW/p.u.MW) denotes the change in system loss due to a unit change in 
load at a bus. This parameter is used to re-value the price offers and also to 
evaluate the benefit accrued, in terms of total loss reduction due to load 
interruption. 
 Step-II, (IL-OPF): A modified version of Base-OPF is used that includes the 
interruptible load offers. The objective is to minimize the SRC. The λ’s 
calculated from Base-OPF are used to formulate SRC. The market is settled on 
first price uniform auction, which means, all selected providers receive a 
uniform price, that is the highest priced offer accepted in the auction. As 
discussed in [4] and [5], this provides the players enough incentives to offer 
their true costs. IL-OPF determines the uniform price ρ ($/MWh) to be paid to 
selected interruptible load contracts and the amount of load to be interrupted for 
each selected offer during the next hour. 
 
A. Base-OPF Model: 
 
Objective Function: The objective is minimization of total system loss (L, p.u. 
MW) during an hour, given by: 
 ( )∑∑ −−+=
i j
ijjijiji VVVVGL )cos(25.0
22
, δδ  (1) 
 Vi is the voltage at bus i, δi is the corresponding voltage angle and Gi,j is the 
conductance of line i-j, p.u. 
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Load Flow Equations: These are modified to include the load interruption ΔPD 
as requested by the ISO from the interruptible load participants. 
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∑
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ΔQD in (4) represents the reactive power relief associated with real power 
interruption ΔPD and will depend on load power factor PF. Type is an index used 
with loads, to distinguish between different customer categories. This 
categorization has been made using different PFs for different customer Type. Yij 
is an element of the network admittance matrix, while θij is the angle associated 
with Yij. 
 
 
In (2), (3) and (4), PG and PD are generation and load at a bus i or j while QG 
and QD are corresponding reactive power generation and demand respectively. It 
may be noted that generation and demand is accounted for by two different 
sources and sinks respectively. For example, we assume a generator ‘i’ is 
producing an amount PGi,b to meets its bilateral contracts and an amount PGi,m to 
sell in the spot market. Similarly, load at bus ‘i’ comprises a part PDi,b that is 
through bilateral contracts and a part PDi,m that is purchased in the spot-market. 
Such representation of the generation and load balance is typical of the 
Swedish/Nordic system which is dominated by bilateral contracts, while also 
having a participation in the spot market.  The bilateral contracts have been 
modeled using the principle of “column rule” and “row rule” and have been 
explained in detail in Appendix 1.  
 
 44 
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
Upper and Lower Limits on Buses Voltages: 
 
NLiVVV
NGiV
iii
i
,...,1     ,
,...,1      constant,
maxmin =∀≤≤
=∀=
                                  (5) 
 Vmax and Vmin are the upper and lower limits on bus voltages. 
 
Upper and Lower Limits on Reactive Power Supports: 
 
NLiQCQCQC iii ,...,1     ,
maxmin =∀≤≤  (6) 
QC is the reactive power compensation required at a bus to maintain voltages 
within specified limits while QCmax and QCmin are the upper and lower limits 
respectively, of reactive power compensation available at a bus. 
 
The Base-OPF model as described above is a nonlinear programming problem 
and is solved using the well-known GAMS/MINOS solver [6]. 
B. IL-OPF Model 
 
Objective Function: The objective is to minimize the secondary reserve service 
cost for each hour: 
 ( )∑∑ Δ⋅⋅−Δ⋅=
i Type
TypeiiTypei PDCLPDSRC ,, λρ  (7) 
 CL denotes the cost of loss ($/MWh) and when multiplied with λi and ΔPDi,Type 
denotes the ISO's benefit from demand reduction at a bus. Evidently, the gross 
economic value of loss reduction from load curtailment depends on location of 
load reduction, given by λi. The first component in (7) denotes the total payment 
made to interruptible load customers selected for interruption. Note that ρ is the 
uniform interruptible load price that is determined from the IL-OPF model and is 
payable to all selected interruptible load offers invoked. 
 
Operating Reserve Constraints: This constraint ensures that a pre-specified and 
mandatory level of operating reserve is maintained at all time. In this paper we 
consider operating reserve to be the generation reserve and is obtained from total 
committed capacity net of generation. 
RESPDPDUCPG
NG
i
NL
i
NIL
i Type
Typeiiii ≥Δ+−⋅∑ ∑ ∑∑ ,max  (8) 
RES denotes the reserve margin requirement for the entire system. 
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Limit on Interruption: The actual interruption invoked by the ISO is constrained 
by the quantity offered by customers for interruption: 
 
NILiUPD TypeiTypeiTypei ,...,1          ,,, =∀⋅≤Δ μ  (9) 
 
Further, the quantity offered by an interruptible load market participant is limited 
by the total demand at its disposal: 
 
NILiPDema TypeiTypei ,...,1          ,0, =∀⋅≤μ  (10) 
 
 U is a binary decision variable denoting the selection (U=1) or otherwise (U=0) 
of interruptible load offers. NIL is the set of buses with customers participating in 
the interruptible load market. PDem is the real power demand by customer Type. 
a0 is a scalar, 0<a0<1, determining how much of the demand can be made available 
for curtailment by a participant without causing any economic loss to itself. 
 
Market Settlement: The interruptible load market is settled on first price uniform 
auction, where all selected offers are paid the same price ρ (interruptible load 
market price), which is the highest accepted offer price. The interruptible load  
market price is determined from IL-OPF using the following inequality constraint: 
 
NILiU TypeiTypei ,...,1                ,, =∀⋅≥ βρ  (11) 
 
Other constraints: Other constraints in the model remain the same as those in 
Base-OPF: 
 Load flow equations (2), (3) and (4) 
 Limits on bus voltages and reactive power support (5) and (6) 
The IL-OPF model, as described above, is a mixed integer nonlinear 
programming problem and is solved using the well-known GAMS/DICOPT solver 
[6]. 
4.3 Simulations And Discussions 
4.3.1 System Descriptions 
 
The CIGRE-32 bus system, which approximately represents the Swedish grid, has 
been used for the simulation studies [7]. The system configuration as well as other 
associated information is provided in Appendix 2. 
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Certain modifications from the given system are incorporated in this work with 
regard to the load representation. The hourly load variation at a bus is accounted 
for by applying a load scaling factor (LSF) at each hour. The load at each hour k 
will thus be calculated as follows: 
 
k
i
k
i LSFPDPD ⋅=    (12) 
 
All buses are classified into three Types, industry (ind), commercial (com) and 
agriculture (agr). Further, at each load bus, the load share (LS) of a particular type 
of customer is allocated using a uniform random number generator. Using LS 
values, customer-type demand at a bus is determined by: 
 
TypeiiTypei LSPDPDem ,, ⋅=    (13) 
 
The load PF of customer types are assumed as follows: 
 
PFInd = 0.95; PFCom = 0.7; PFAgr = 0.8 
 
4.3.2 Simulation Studies 
 
The procurement scheme described in Section 4.2.2 is used to carry out case 
studies to examine the operation of the interruptible load market and its role in 
aiding system operation during contingencies. The simulation cases constructed 
for analysis include: 
 
 Case 1: Base-case market for interruptible load 
 Case 2: Base-case market for interruptible load with loss of a large 
generator (1000 MW) during peak hours (17.00 – 21.00) 
 Case 3: Real power market demand increases sharply during 17.00–21.00        
hours 
 
Since the interruptible load market is proposed to function as an hour-ahead 
market, the participants can be expected to have information on next hour demand 
(and hence system reserve) forecast, transmission capacity limits across the 
borders and outage conditions in the system, if any, made available by the ISO. It 
is natural that interruptible load offer prices will be sensitive to operating reserve 
availability during the next hour. 
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Figure 4-2 shows a typically expected as well as a simplified trend of offer price 
as a function of the operating reserve. Figure 4-2 (a) depicts the likely bidding 
behavior of interruptible load participants in response to the level of system 
reserve. The ISO can be expected to be aware of such behavior from the market 
participants and incorporate that in its market settlement model in order to arrive at 
a realistic decision on selection of interruptible loads. Thus, the details of Figure 4-
2 are being handled by the ISO. However, since determining the exact function for 
such behavior is very difficult, for the sake of simplicity, we use a linear function 
(Figure 4-2 (b)). Further, we also incorporate an upper limit on operating reserves, 
RLIM, above which interruptible load will not be required by the ISO. This allows 
the interruptible load market to address critical system conditions only.  
 
RLIM Reserve0
Offer price
  simplification for
the model
Reserve0
Offer price
(a) (b)
expected trend
 
 
Figure 4-2: Expected and simplified bidding behaviors  
of interruptible load market participants 
 
From Figure 4-2 (b), the offer price β can be given as: 
 
  (14) 
on)interrupti (no  when ,,...,1  0
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As mentioned in (8), RES denotes the reserve margin requirement for the entire 
system while RLIM is the reserve limit above which interruptible load market is 
not operated. 
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Figure 4-3 shows the nominal load curve of the system and how the load curve is 
modified after the base-case market for interruptible load is activated. It is seen 
from Figure 4-3 that the peak load occurs during hours 11-13 and 18-20. The base-
case market works particularly effectively during the evening hours (18-20) and 
helps flatten the peak to a certain extent. The total load interruption called for, 
during hour 19 is about 6.4% of the total demand at that hour. It is also seen that 
the interruptible load market price (shown on the secondary y-axis) corresponds to 
activation of the load interruptions. 
 
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Hour
Lo
ad
, p
.u
.M
W
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
Pr
ic
e,
 $
/M
W
h
Base load curve
Interruptible load market, case-1
Interruptible load market price
 
Figure 4-3: Operation of the base-case interruptible load market (Case 1) 
 
As described earlier, for Case-2, we consider the loss of one large generator 
occurring during hours 17.00-21.00 when the base-case market is operating. 
Understandably, more interruptible loads are contracted and invoked in this case 
(13.6% of the total peak demand) by the ISO in order to maintain the system 
conditions within allowable limits (Figure 4-4). 
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Figure 4-4: Operation of the interruptible load market with one  
large generator on outage 
 
The market price for interruptible load is now significantly higher during the 
hours when load curtailments are required. This shows a direct dependence of the 
interruptible load market price on prevalent system conditions, in particular, on 
available system reserves. 
 
Case-3 scenario, where the demand in spot-market increases sharply, shows that 
the interruptible load providers help to reduce the system demand (Figure 4-5) and 
keeps the system in balance.  
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Figure 4-5: Operation of interruptible load market 
with spot-market demand spikes 
 
However, the ISO has to pay a very high price to these providers since the 
interruptible load offer prices tend to be high in this case. From Figure 4-5, we can 
also note that the interruptible load market price is highly elastic to the system 
demand. 
 
Table 4-1 shows the total interruption and total payment by the ISO during a day 
for different cases. For the most severe contingency case (case 3), the ISO has to 
pay the maximum in order to compensate for the shortfall in available generation. 
 
Table 4-1:  Total Interruption and Payment 
 
 Payment,  
US$ 
Total 
interruption, 
MWh 
Case 1 28,925 3,208 
Case 2 82,181 6,906 
Case 3 165,648 10,603 
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4.3.3 Relationship Between Reserve and Actual Interruption 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between the actual interruption invoked by 
the ISO vis-à-vis the reserve available, we employed an econometric technique, 
the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). The details of this method is 
presented in the Appendix 3. In this method, the amount of real power interruption 
called for by the ISO is regressed over the reserve level of the system over 24 
hours of a day. In order to have a large sample set of interruptible loads, the real 
power demand was increased 1.5 times as compared to those reported in Section 
4.3.2.  As can be seen in Figure 4-6, there is a fairly strong correlation between 
load interruption and reserves. 
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Figure 4-6: Load interruption versus system reserve 
 
The econometric exercise also indicates that the reserve level is a highly 
significant variable in predicting the load interruption. Table 4-2 gives the 
estimated coefficients for a combined relationship for all hours and all scenarios 
considered together. In Table 4-2, N is the number of observations, x-variable is 
the reserve level of the system. t-statistics indicates the level of significance of the 
estimated coefficients. Any value of t-statistics greater than 2.6, in absolute terms, 
reflects that the coefficient is significant at 1% [8]. R2 indicates how closely the 
estimated model fits with the observed data. From the obtained values of R2 in 
Table 4-2, we see that the system reserve level explains up to 57%, the load 
curtailment decisions of the ISO considering a linear model, while up to 59% 
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when a second-order polynomial model is used. The estimated linear and second-
order polynomial models are given by (15) and (16), respectively: 
 
 
4131.6)(711.0 +⋅−=Δ RESPD  (15) 
 
( ) ( ) 383.5587.0013.0 2 +⋅−⋅=Δ RESRESPD   (16) 
 
Table 4-2: Econometric Estimates of Load Interruption as Functions of Reserve 
 
 Intercept 
(t-statistics)
x-variable 
(t-statistics) 
x2-
variable
R2 N 
Linear 6.4131***
(8.08) 
-0.7109***
(-9.59) 
- 0.57 72 
Polynomial 5.38***
(5.49) 
-0.587***
(-5.76) 
0.013 
(1.736)
0.59 72 
*** Denotes significance at 1% 
 
4.3.4 Market Power in Interruptible Load Markets 
 
Interruptible load services, provided through a competitive market can sometimes 
provide strategic advantages to certain loads by virtue of their location in the 
system. In this sub-section we attempt to examine if such strategic advantages do 
exist at any load bus in the system, whether certain loads have market power, i.e., 
do they manage to remain the price setter under all circumstances? If such 
situations exist, how do we identify those loads? This information can help the 
ISO to handle the interruptible load market more efficiently. 
 
In order to address these issues, we examine for every hour, which buses retain 
the power to set the market price. Five scenarios (S1 to S5) are constructed with 
the assumption that load at all buses indulge in gaming simultaneously by 
increasing their offer prices by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%, respectively.  
 
In Table 4-3, we list the price-setter bus for each hour and for all five scenarios 
as well as for the base case. The following observations can be made from the 
table: 
 No interruption is called for at hours 2, 4, 7, and 22 in any of the scenarios, 
hence there are no price-setter buses for these hours.  
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 In the base case scenario, there are eight buses (1022, 1041, 1042, 1043, 
1044, 1045, and 4072) which account for the price-setting of the remaining 
20 hours. Of these, bus 1041 accounts for price setting in 6 hours (11, 15, 17, 
18, 19, and 23) and 4072 in 4 hours (8, 14, 21, and 24).  
 Considering the gaming scenarios, we see that bus 1044, which is the price-
setter for hours 1, 9, and 12 in the base case, has the market power during 
hours 9, 12, and 20.  
 Buses 1042, 4071, and 4072 do not hold any market power. If theses buses 
indulge in gaming, these do not remain as price-setters any longer.  
 Bus 1045, which was the price-setter for hour 6 only in the base case, can 
hold a very high market power if it indulges in gaming. As we see across 
scenarios, it can hold price setting power for hours 5, 6, 14, 18, and 21.  
 Buses 1022 and 1043 hold market power at hours 8 and 17, respectively. 
 Bus 1041, which in the base case is the price-setter for 6 hours during 
afternoon and evening peak periods, retains considerable market power if it 
indulges in gaming. As seen from scenarios, it holds market power in hours 
10, 11, 13, 15, and 16.  
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Table 4-3: Price-Setter Buses for Each Hour in  
Different Gaming Scenarios 
 
Hour Base Case
Scenario 
S1 
(+10%)
S2 
(+20%)
S3 
(+30%)
S4 
(+40%)
S5 
(+50%) 
1 1044 1042 1012 1012 1012 1012 
3 1042 4071 4071 1042 1045 1045 
5 1042 1042 1045 1045 1045 1045 
6 1045 1045 1045 1045 1022 2031 
8 4072 1022 1022 1022 1022 1011 
9 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044 2032 
10 1022 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 
11 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1022 
12 1044 1044 1044 1044 1041 1012 
13 1022 1013 1041 1041 1041 1041 
14 4072 4072 4072 1045 1045 1045 
15 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 
16 1043 1041 1041 1041 1041 1012 
17 1041 1043 1043 1043 1043 1011 
18 1041 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 
19 1041 1044 1022 1022 1043 1043 
20 4071 2031 1044 1044 1044 1044 
21 4072 4072 1045 1045 1045 1045 
23 1041 1011 1011 1011 1011 1011 
24 4072 4072 4072 1013 1042 4072 
 
Table 4-4 summarizes the load buses which hold the market power (i.e., remain 
as the price-setter) in different hours in a day across different scenarios.  
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Table 4-4: Buses with Market Power During Hours in A Day 
 
Buses Hours 
1012 1 
1045  5,6,14, 18,21 
1022 8 
1044 9,12,20 
1041 10,11,13,15,16 
1043 17 
1011 23 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the design of a market for interruptible load services within the 
secondary reserve ancillary service market has been proposed. The location aspect 
of interruptible load offers has been incorporated in the market framework through 
marginal loss coefficients at every load bus. The paper also attempts to incorporate 
the behavior of interruptible load offers with respect to the information on system 
operating reserve forecast. The case studies show that the interruptible load market 
helps to reduce the system demand during the peak hours and in cases of 
contingencies. The market price is highly sensitive to the system operating 
conditions and demand. Econometric analysis shows the existence of a close 
relationship between the reserve level and actual load interruption. It was also 
found that at some buses, the loads may have the capability to retain market power 
through gaming on their offer prices. This needs to be mitigated by the system 
operator through investments in generation capacity at such buses. With a proper 
contracting and market settlement framework, as proposed in this paper, the 
interruptible load market would be an effective option as an ancillary service for 
the system operator to choose amongst its available services. 
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CHAPTER 5*
TRANSMISSION CONGESTION MANAGEMENT IN  
DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS: A REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of utility practices as well as 
research methods in the area of transmission congestion management in 
deregulated electricity markets. The classification of congestion management 
methods has been made according to security-constrained generation re-dispatch, 
zonal/cluster-based management, network-sensitivity-factor-based method, 
congestion management using FACTS devices, congestion pricing and market-
based methods, congestion management using demand-side resource. The other 
important part of this paper is the discussion on international practices in 
congestion management at various electricity markets around the world- 
California, New York, New England, PJM, ERCOT, Nordic and the Spanish 
power market. The working mechanisms for congestion management by these 
utilities are discussed. It can be seen in the paper that many electricity markets 
are utilizing the methods which are widely addressed in the literature of the 
power engineering community. However, the methods used are widely different 
from one another as a result of different congestion management objectives in 
various electricity markets. 
5.1 Introduction 
 
An important aspect of the efficient operation of competitive electricity markets is 
judicious integration of the fundamentals of market economics with physical 
characteristics of operating the power system. Among the most critical issues in 
operating the system are managing transmission congestion and scheduling 
ancillary services. Transmission congestion occurs whenever the state of the 
power grid is characterized by one or more violations of the physical, operational, 
or policy constraints under which the grid operates in the normal state or under 
any credible contingency [1]-[3].   
 
                                                     
* The work contained in this chapter has been published in the following papers: 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya and J. Daalder, “Review of Congestion Management Methods 
in Deregulated Power Market”, in Proc. of 7th IASTED International Conference on 
Power and Energy Systems (PES 2004), Florida, USA, November 28 - December 1, 2004. 
 
L.A. Tuan and K. Bhattacharya and J. Daalder, “Congestion Management Strategies in 
Deregulated Power Market: A Theoretical Review and Reflections in Practice”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems (in review) 
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Physical upgrades to the existing transmission capacities are not the only 
solution to the congestion problem. Market-based mechanisms, offering a more 
efficient utilisation of the capacity, often offer a viable alternative. In the erstwhile 
vertically integrated utilities, the system operator sought to maximize the social 
welfare with distributional equity (meeting the load at all times) as the main 
criteria, for the system as a whole. The operating paradigm was based on 
achieving the system solution while meeting reliability and security margins. In 
this operating paradigm, the system operator knows the marginal cost of 
production of each generating unit and an Optimal Power Flow (OPF) tool is used 
to re-dispatch these units to avoid transmission congestion in a least-cost manner. 
Since the nineties decade, many electric utilities world-wide have been forced to 
change their ways of doing business, from vertically integrated functioning to 
open-market systems. The reasons have been many, and differed, across regions 
and countries. Reforms were undertaken by introducing commercial incentives in 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, with in many cases, large 
efficiency gains. Though this may seem fairly straight-forward at first glance, 
there are several complexities involved in restructuring and several new issues 
have surfaced. Some of them have been solved while others are being debated at 
various levels. One of those new issues is congestion management. Congestion 
management has become more important and difficult in the emerging deregulated 
electricity markets due to the increased number and magnitude of power 
transactions as well as due to the obvious fact that congestions in the transmission 
system will create problems to the delivery of power transactions, increase market 
price and market power [4]-[6]. 
 
The objectives of congestion management would now be i) to develop MW 
schedules which minimizes the system cost variation of the initial market clearing 
while fulfilling system security criteria; ii) to provide appropriate economic 
signals that are consistent with the MW schedules; iii) to facilitate the 
management of transmission congestion risks. Congestion management is also 
done with respect to maximizing the overall satisfaction degree of all participants 
in the market [7]-[9]. Three broad methods of congestion management are 
currently in use around the world. One method is basically a centralized 
optimization exercise, either explicitly with some form of generation re-dispatch 
with security and transmission constraints, or implicitly, direct control of system 
operators control congestion [10]. A second method is based on the use of price 
signals derived from ex ante market resolution to deter congestion by allowing 
congestion to constrain scheduled generator output prior to real time operation. 
Inevitably some congestion may still arise and must be corrected in real time by 
centralized control [11]. A third method seeks to control congestion by allowing or 
disallowing bilateral transmission, agreements between a producer and a 
consumer, based on the effect of the transaction on the transmission system [1].  
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The objective of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review on existing 
congestion management methods that are available in the technical literature being 
put forward in the course of deregulation. 
 
5.2 Congestion Management Methods Reported in Literature 
 
Several methods have been reported that address the congestion management 
problem in deregulated electricity markets. These can be classified into broad 
groups, as follows (Figure 5-1): 
 
 security-constrained generation re-dispatch 
 zonal / cluster-based management 
 network sensitivity factor based method 
 using demand response ancillary services 
 using financial transmission rights (FTRs) 
 congestion pricing and market based methods, using demand side resource 
 using FACTS devices 
 congestion pricing and market-based methods 
 and some other methods.  
 
Solutions techniques for these congestion management methods also belong to the 
publication classification map.  
 
 
Congestion 
Management 
Methods
Zonal/Cluster-based
congestion 
management 
Security-
constrained 
generation 
re-dispatch 
Network sensitivity 
factors-based 
method 
Congestion pricing 
and market-based 
methods 
Congestion 
management using 
FACTS 
Financial 
Transmission 
Rights (FTRs) 
method
Demand-response 
congestion 
management 
Other  
methods 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Categorization of congestion management methods 
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5.2.1 Security-Constrained Generation Re-dispatch 
 
One of the most common approaches to alleviate congestion in the network is to 
re-schedule of the generation by the optimal power flow model with transmission 
constraints as well as bus-voltage constraints to maintain the system security. An 
unified framework for the representation of market dispatch and re-dispatch 
problems that the independent grid operator must solve in congestion management 
in various jurisdictions was developed in [2]. This framework is used to compare 
the performance of different congestion management approaches that exist today 
in various markets in the world. An optimization procedure for re-dispatch of 
generation is proposed in [12] in order to alleviate transmission congestion on the 
network. Consequently, a new approach to allocate the cost of congestion and 
losses to the nodes of the transmission network based on node’s responsibility is 
proposed. While a minimum-distance generation re-dispatch was suggested in 
[13], where the economic value of the transaction adjustment is dis-regarded. 
 
 While solving the congestion problem with generation re-dispatch, Huang and 
Yan [14] investigates the impacts of thyristor controlled series capacitor (TCSC) 
and static VAr compensator (SVC) with the objective of minimizing the total 
amount of transactions being curtailed on this re-dispatch method. This paper 
suggested that the improvement of total transfer capability (TTC) by using TCSC 
and SVC with the consideration of transaction patterns would reduce the 
possibility of congestion occurrence. An optimization method to analyze and solve 
the transmission overloads that arise in each hourly scenario of the Spanish power 
system, after the electricity market has been cleared, was proposed in [15]. 
Congestions in the Spanish electricity market could be removed by increasing and 
decreasing generation of connected units, and by connecting off-line ones.  
 
Yamin and Shahidehpour [16] proposes a generalized active/reactive iterative 
coordination process between generation companies (GENCOs) and the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) for active (transmission congestion) and 
reactive (voltage profile) management in the day-ahead market. GENCOs apply 
priced-based unit commitment without transmission and voltage security 
constraints, schedule their units and submit their initial bids to the ISO. The ISO 
executes congestion and voltage profile management for eliminating transmission 
and voltage profile violations. If violations are not eliminated, the ISO minimizes 
the transmission and voltage profile violations and sends a signal via the Internet 
to GENCOs. GENCOs reschedule their units taking into account the ISO signals 
and submit modified bids to the ISO.  
 
A combination of load curtailment and generation redispatch was used for 
congestion management procedure as suggested in [17]. A set of indices is 
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introduced to measure the effectiveness, extent of load curtailment, and economic 
impact. The procedure can select the most effective load curtailment option, which 
is agreeable to the customer affected and economically desirable. Matching 
generation redispatch procedures have been tested with minimal adjustment cost 
optimization and bilateral transaction approaches. This procedure is simple to 
implement, and transparent to transmission users and would encourage elastic use 
of electricity in congested conditions, and also to discourage market manipulation 
by local suppliers. 
 
The generation ramping constraints was incorporated into congestion 
management in [18]. The paper presents the congestion management formulation 
with ramping constraints for day-ahead (DA) and hour-ahead (HA) markets. It is 
suggested in the paper that ramping constraints play an important roles in 
congestion management. Due to this type of constraints, resources scheduled in 
different periods in forward market congestion management cannot be determined 
separately as the schedules of one period will restrict scheduling in other periods. 
Therefore, the congestion charge would be shifted from one period to another 
period without considering ramping constraints. 
 
A system of advanced analytical methods and tools for secure and efficient 
operation of power systems in emerging energy markets was proposed in [19]. For 
this purpose, the concept of the independent system operator (ISO) as a “generic” 
operator of an open-access transmission system was defined, so that those 
functions of the ISO that are essential for the security and efficiency of power 
system operation can be identified that would enable the ISO to perform the bulk 
of these functions. 
 
A new OPF model, which is characterized by the introduction of a two-sided 
auction market structure with power demand elasticity while taking into account 
the network constraints, is proposed in [20]. In this type of market structure, the 
ISO has additional degrees of freedom in managing congestion conditions because 
load demand is now a variable. The use of the OPF is envisaged in a pool model 
where the ISO has a centralized dispatch function and he is also responsible for the 
security and the quality of operation. It is shown that OPF based on a two sided 
auction structure will reduces nodal price volatility and allow for congestion relief.  
 
Transmission network plays a major role in the open access deregulated power 
market. In this environment, transmission congestion is a major problem that 
requires further consideration especially when inter-zonal/intra-zonal scheme is 
implemented in [21], and in [22]. A congestion problem formulation should take 
into consideration interactions between intra-zonal and inter-zonal flows and their 
effects on power systems. It is perceived that phase-shifters and tap transformers 
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play vital preventive and corrective roles in congestion management. These 
control devices help the ISO mitigate congestion without re-dispatching generation 
away from preferred schedules. In this paper, a procedure for minimizing the 
number of adjustments of preferred schedules to alleviate congestion and apply 
control schemes to minimize interactions between zones while taking contingency-
constrained limits into consideration was introduced. The paper also shows the 
stage where the ISO performs contingency analysis during congestion 
management, and shows the effect of contingency limits on congestion 
management. The proposed formulation could save computation time, increase the 
system security and apply control variables efficiently in the transmission system 
management to keep power system operation close to preferred schedules. 
 
5.2.2 Congestion Pricing and Market-Based Methods 
 
In [23], price (marginal cost) signals were used for the generators to manage 
congestion and the solution under rational behaviour assumption is identical to an 
OPF solution. A similar approach was suggested for the pool model in [24], where 
the cost of congestion was bundled with the marginal cost at each bus. A bilateral 
model was also investigated, and a congestion cost minimization approach was 
proposed. A framework for real-time congestion management under a marker 
structure similar to the newly proposed UK trading arrangement is presented in 
[25], in which not only resources in balancing market but also some bilateral 
contracts can be dispatched if necessary. The linearized model of a modified 
optimal power flow (OPF) is proposed to implement such a framework.   
 
A new framework was presented in [26] to manage dynamic congestion. The 
main feature of the proposed model is that system stability is incorporated into the 
congestion management, and the concept of market-based congestion management 
is extended into the dynamic scenario. Under the proposed framework, the ISO 
can eliminate the dynamic congestion with available resources in the real-time 
dynamic congestion management market. The total dynamic congestion 
management cost will be minimized, and system security as well as the scheduled 
transactions are maintained.  
 
A new congestion management system is proposed by [27], applied under nodal 
and zonal dispatches with implementation of fixed transmission rights (FTR) and 
flowgate rights (FGR), respectively. The FTR model proves to be especially 
suitable for congestion management in deregulated centralized market structures 
with nodal dispatch, while the FGR is suitable for decentralized markets. The main 
contribution of this work is a non-traditional valuation of FGR under a centralized 
market, such as those present in Latin America, that builds a link between both 
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transmission rights under the same market structure. To accomplish that, a 
computational model is developed, implementing marginal theory where 
congestion components are introduced in the pricing model. An application to the 
Chilean Central Interconnected System indicates that FGR presents advantages 
over FTR regarding signals on grid use, but its application results in complications 
that make its implementation unattractive. 
 
Service identification and congestion management are important functions of the 
ISO in maintaining system security and reliability [28]. Most approaches in the 
literature solve the problem sequentially, which may lead to an under or over-
estimation of the service requirement and transaction curtailment. A few of them 
do it iteratively which is quite time consuming. In this paper, a combined 
framework for service identification and congestion management is proposed. The 
ideal objective function is to maximize the overall profit of all market participants. 
Practically, an upper bound cost minimization is suggested and has been applied to 
identify two of the services, the reactive  support and real power loss services, in 
case of congestion. The service costs plus the congestion cost are minimized. 
Results show that the proposed approach results in a smaller transaction 
curtailment. The curtailment also depends on the relative cost of congestion with 
respect to the cost of services. 
 
Hao and Shirmohammadi [29] presents a method and a model for managing 
transmission congestion based on ex ante congestion prices. The method is 
influenced by the yield management approach widely used for airline reservation 
systems, and their model is built based on the relations between transmission 
congestion prices and electricity commodity prices that exist for an optimal 
solution. They formulate the congestion pricing problem as a master problem and 
the electricity commodity (energy and reserve) pricing as sub-problems. Examples 
are presented to illustrate how a system operator can use this approach to compute 
ex ante congestion prices and how market operators can determine clearing prices 
and schedules of forward electric energy and reserve markets. 
 
The potential for strategic bidding in deregulated electricity markets is well 
known. Earlier work has highlighted the role of congestion in such strategies [30], 
[31]. In [31], A model in which a supplier can create congestion problems in a 
non-congestive system even when he is the not the low cost supplier of the system 
is examined. If that supplier has several units located at different buses in the grid, 
it can profit from creating congestion under some auction mechanisms actually in 
use or under consideration. An integrated auction prevents profitable gaming, but 
requires the simultaneous handling of market clearing and system dispatch, raising 
concerns about the neutrality of the system operator.  
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A bid-based congestion management scheme for a system that accommodates 
many bilateral transactions was presented in [32]. The paper proposes a new 
allocation method for allocating the cost of congestion relief to transactions that 
cause the congestion. The allocation reflects the actual usage of the congested 
facilities by the transactions and recovers the cost. Also proposed in the paper is a 
“consistency” test to quantify and test the equity/fairness of the method. Test 
results illustrate that the method provides better price signals for relieving 
congestion on lines than the shadow prices. The test results also indicate that the 
method recovers the cost. The results on consistency indicate that the proposed 
method is consistent provided that the transactions causing counter-flows on 
congested lines be compensated. 
 
5.2.3 Network Sensitivity Factors Methods 
 
Other method for congestion management proved to be efficient is the use of 
network sensitivity factors, which is the relationship between the change in power 
injection and the change in power flow in the network, has been demonstrated in 
[33]-[39]. 
 
In a deregulated electricity market, it may always not be possible to dispatch all 
of the contracted power transactions due to congestion of the transmission 
corridors. System operators try to manage congestion, which otherwise increases 
the cost of the electricity and also threatens the system security and stability. In 
this paper, a new zonal/cluster-based congestion management approach has been 
proposed. The zones have been determined based on lines real and reactive power 
flow sensitivity indexes also called as real and reactive transmission congestion 
distribution factors. The generators in the most sensitive zones, with strongest and 
non-uniform distribution of sensitivity indexes, are identified for rescheduling 
their real power output for congestion management. In addition, the impact of 
optimal rescheduling of reactive power output by generators and capacitors in the 
most sensitive zones has also been studied [33]. 
 
Some closed formulas that express the contribution of each generator to the 
power flows, loads and losses in a power system are introduced. The derivation of 
the formulas is based on the sensitivity and corrective action analysis of the 
system. The applicability of the proposed formulas is demonstrated using various 
test systems and they are compared with other state-of-the-art methods. Also these 
formulas are tested on a practical system to relieve transmission congestion 
problems and calculate the use-of-transmission system charges [34]. 
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With the separate pricing of generation and transmission, it has become 
necessary to find the capacity usage of different transactions occurring at the same 
time so that a fair use-of-transmission-system charge can be given separately to 
individual customers. It is also helpful to transmission congestion management if 
the power produced by each generator and consumed by each load could be 
tracked through the network, The existing proportional sharing and circuits based 
methods, and the newly developed power flow comparison method are introduced 
and compared in this paper. The power flow comparison method offers more 
alternatives in using available transmission capacity and pricing line flows, and 
provides the user with sensitivity information on how proposed corrections will 
affect the flows in other critical lines [35]. 
5.2.4 Application of FACTS Devices 
 
An alternative to building new transmission lines to solve the frequently occurred 
congestion problems is to use Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) [40]-
[44]. However, a key issue is still missing, which is the pricing scheme for the 
utilization of FACTS devices and penalty for users to operate at their limits. 
Unless this issue is addressed, no proper incentives can be provided to market 
participants for new constructions. A pricing scheme for FACTS devices in 
congestion management, which addresses both the penalty and the utilization 
issues, is proposed in [40]. Three different congestion management systems are, 
which are established in the liberalized market, described in [42]. A basic idea 
how to integrate load flow controlling devices (e.g. FACTS devices) in these 
congestion management systems in order to assess the necessary profitableness is 
presented. 
 
FACTS devices such as thyristor controlled series compensators and thyristor 
controlled phase angle regulators, by controlling the power flows in the network, 
can help to reduce the flows in heavily loaded lines resulting in an increased 
loadability of the network and reduced cost of production [41]. Congestion 
management using FACTS devices requires a two step approach. First, the optimal 
location of these devices in the network must be ascertained and then, the settings 
of their control parameters optimised. The development of simple and efficient 
models for optimal location of FACTS devices that can be used for congestion 
management by controlling their parameters optimally is presented in the paper.   
 
Although FACTS devices and unified power flow controllers (UPFCs) have 
proven to be powerful tools for the exploitation of network capacities, their 
performances with regard to transient stability have not been deeply explored yet. 
In this work, we propose a methodology to assess preventive control actions 
through adjustments of UPFC reference signals. This control action does not imply 
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changes in the generation and load asset defined by day-ahead market laws. The 
representation of UPFC devices in a power system is given through a nonlinear 
model. The UPFC model includes electrical equivalent circuits, a local control 
scheme, and a centralized control scheme. Control actions are evaluated through a 
nonlinear optimization process. The approach is tested on a detailed representation 
of the Italian national grid and test results are presented [43]. 
 
Financial transmission rights (FTRs) auction is an important method for 
allocating the network transmission capabilities to the market participants who 
value them most. FACTS devices are modeled as additional power injection at 
buses in the presented linear optimization problem of FTRs auction, which is 
based on a dc power flow model [44]. 
 
5.2.5 Zonal/Cluster-Based Management Approach 
 
The congestion management zones have been determined based on lines real and 
reactive power flow sensitivity indexes also called as real and reactive 
transmission congestion distribution factors. The generators in the most sensitive 
zones, with strongest and non-uniform distribution of sensitivity indexes, are 
identified for rescheduling their real power output for congestion management 
[33]. A new method has been proposed to calculate and settle zonal congestion 
cost in deregulated power markets, which are a mix of the pool model and the 
bilateral model. Based on the different settlement methods deployed, deregulated 
power markets can be divided into pay-as-marginal-price market, pay-as-market-
clearing-price market, and pay-as-bid market. All the three kinds of markets are 
considered in the proposed new method by solving the same optimization problem 
of zonal congestion management. For a pay-as-market-clear-price market, an 
average shadow price has been introduced to properly charge the zonal congestion 
impact, while maintaining revenue neutrality of the independent system operator 
(ISO). This new method deploys preferred balancing energy services by solving 
the optimization problem of zonal congestion management. The total system 
ancillary energy service cost is reduced to a minimum. The market 
indiscrimination and the revenue neutrality of the ISO are automatically 
maintained in this new method [45]. 
 
Declaring that engineering studies and experience are the criteria to defining 
zonal boundaries, or to define a zone based on the fact that it is a densely 
interconnected area and paths connecting these densely interconnected areas are 
inter-zonal lines, will render insufficient and fuzzy definitions. The zone definition 
is given a certain criterion based on the locational marginal price (LMP). This 
concept is used to define zonal boundaries and to decide whether any zone should 
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be merged with another zone or split into new zones. Alomoush and Shahidehpour 
[46] combines zonal and fixed transmission rights schemes to manage congestion. 
This combined scheme is utilised with LMPs to define zonal boundaries more 
appropriately. The scheme presented gains the best features of the transmission 
rights scheme, which are providing financial certainty, maximising the efficient 
use of the system and making users pay for the actual use of congested paths. 
5.2.6 Demand-Response for Congestion Management 
 
As we have observed, congestion relief is normally carried out through generators 
in the short-term by redispatching available generation to avoid congestion and 
other associated problems in various contingency situations. This form of 
congestion service provision is referred to as preventive management [15]. If 
however, the cost of such preventive management is too high, then it would be 
more cost-effective to invest in transmission system reinforcement which can be 
referred to as long-term congestion management. A somewhat “in-between” 
alternative to the above two, is to create provisions for load interruption in a 
judicious manner that could aid in transmission congestion relief, which can be 
referred to as corrective management [47]. In the context of deregulated markets, 
introducing the provision that allows customers to offer their interruptible load for 
competitive procurement by the ISO is a topical issue. Participation of the 
customers in this provision for congestion relief could significantly increase the 
number of service providers, and hence locations, available to the ISO. The 
economic validity of interruptible load depends on the difference in potential 
savings in congestion cost and costs involved in procuring interruptible load 
services offered by various consumers [17],[48]. It is demonstrated in [49] that 
appropriate invocation of interruptible loads by the ISO can aid in relieving 
transmission congestion in power systems. An auction model is proposed, for an 
ISO operating in a bilateral contract dominated market, for real-time selection of 
interruptible load offers while satisfying the congestion management objective. 
The N-1 contingency criterion has been taken into account to simulate various 
cases and hence examine the effectiveness of the proposed method. It is shown 
that the method can assist the ISO to remove the overload from lines in both 
normal and contingency conditions in the optimal manner. 
 
The role of demand elasticity in congestion management and pricing in a 
competitive electricity market was investigated in [50]. The actions of price 
responsive loads could be represented in terms of the customer's willingness-to-
pay. From each customer's demand curve, the elasticity of the load at different 
prices is known and the benefit function is derived. The load at each bus ceases to 
be a fixed quantity and becomes a decision variable in the ISO's optimization 
problem. In this way, the ISO has additional degrees of freedom in determining 
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necessary actions for network congestion management. The impact of multilateral 
congestion management on the reliability of power transactions is assessed in [51]. 
This assessment is based on reliability indices such as expected power 
curtailments, curtailment probability, expected cost of congestion management 
and probability distributions of the total power curtailment. It is demonstrated in 
the paper that the multilateral management results in smaller curtailments and 
congestion costs than traditional bilateral management. 
5.2.7 Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) 
 
An FTR is a financial risk-management instrument. FTRs are used to hedge the 
costs associated with transmission congestion. It represents a specified MW 
amount between (usually) two points in the power transmission network. It is valid 
over a defined period of time, typically a month, season or year, and often only for 
peak or off-peak hours. Whenever there is transmission congestion in the FTR’s 
defined direction, the FTR will earn congestion revenue for its holder from the 
ISO. The FTR’s primary purpose is to offset a transmission user’s congestion 
charges, which are typically quite volatile. However, in today’s open FTR auctions 
and secondary markets, FTRs can also be arbitraged by any accredited 
transmission nonuser ([52]-[56]). Currently these rights are in use in PJM, New 
York and New England. A variant of financial transmission rights, which has both 
a physical and a financial aspect, was introduced in California in 2000. Similarly, 
flowgates were introduced in Texas in 2002 ([57]-[59]). 
 
5.3 Congestion Management: Solution Techniques 
 
The previous section classifies the congestion management methods by subjects or 
activities which need to be carried out. This section, however, attempts to look at 
congestion management from another angle, that is the solution techniques which 
are used to solve the congestion problems. Solution techniques which are available 
in the literature can be put into four broad categories, and are shown in Figure 5-2. 
The most common techniques used is the linear programming method, and the dc-
based method, followed by the decentralized and integrated solution techniques. 
Each of the techniques are presented in details in the following section.  
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Figure 5-2: Solution techniques for congestion management 
 
5.3.1 Linear Programming Methods 
 
In [60], an augmented Lagrangian relaxation based algorithm for regional 
decomposition optimal power flow (OPF) is presented to address congestion 
management across interconnected regions. An OPF problem is decomposed into 
regional sub-problems through Lagrangian relaxation. Unlike other existing 
methods, no dummy generators or loads are added into the original network 
model. Applying this algorithm with the real-time balancing mechanism, the 
problem of active power congestion management across interconnected regions is 
separated into quadratic regional sub-problems, which can be solved either 
sequentially or in parallel. With this approach, regional ISOs can relieve network 
congestion co-ordinately without knowing any other regions' network information 
but the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers of coupling constraints between 
regions. 
  
A new framework of real-time congestion management under a deregulation 
environment is discussed in [61], in which not only resources in balancing market 
but also some short-term bilateral contracts can be dispatched if necessary. The 
real-time reactive power and voltage support is also included in this framework. 
The linearized model of a modified decoupled optimal power flow is proposed to 
implement such a framework. A primal-dual interior point linear programming 
method with second-order predictor-corrector techniques is applied to solve this 
optimization problem efficiently.  
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In [62], an efficient and practical hybrid model has been proposed for congestion 
management analysis for both real and reactive power transaction under 
deregulated power system environments. The proposed hybrid model determines 
the optimal bilateral or multilateral transaction and their corresponding load 
curtailment in two stages. In the first stage classical gradient descent optimal 
power flow algorithm has been used to determine the set of feasible curtailment 
strategies for different amount of real and reactive power transactions. Whereas in 
the second stage, a fuzzy decision opinion matrix has been used to select the 
optimal transaction strategy considering increase in private power transaction, 
reduction in percentage curtailment, and its corresponding change in per unit 
generation cost and hence profit as fuzzy variables. 
 
5.3.2 DC-Based Congestion Management 
 
It is difficult to arrive at the exact solutions of the complex network calculations 
within a short time, especially during the operation of power systems. It can 
therefore be seen from the literature that approximation of the network based on 
dc-load flow is a preferred technique in many congestion management due to its 
simple nature in calculation while giving the results with reasonable accuracy [51], 
[63]-[65].  
 
5.3.3 Integrated Solution 
 
The rapid growth of inter-regional trading among electricity markets requires the 
development of new market-oriented mechanisms for the inter-regional congestion 
management of such trading [66]. An alternative approach to inter-regional trade 
that avoids the flaws of forward markets with explicit auctioning of 
interconnections capacities is proposed. We propose the integration of a forward 
market with a balancing (spot) market for inter-regional exchanges based on nodal 
pricing. The interaction of transmission system operators (TSOs) belonging to 
adjacent markets is efficiently taken into account through a decentralized OPF, 
which is solved by interior point methods. 
 
The problem of inter-ISO congestion management using optimization-based 
techniques is address in [67]. This requires the coordination of involved ISOs and 
raises the problem of how different network operators will coordinate their 
operations to achieve system-wide efficiency. An auction mechanism have been 
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proposed, and test results show that system-wide efficiency can be achieved using 
a decentralized and coordinated optimization-based approach. 
 
Two multivariate methods (correlation analysis and principal components 
analysis) are used to forecast which lines may be simultaneously congested [68]. 
These statistical methods are applied to a database which takes into account 
transmission planning uncertainties such as localization of new independent power 
producers and new eligible customers (i.e., customers who can choose their energy 
supplier), and level of international exchanges. To face the very large number of 
possible configurations, a design of experiment is used to create the data base. A 
complete active/reactive-power flow program is used to simulate the power 
system. Knowing which lines will be simultaneously congested may help the 
system operator to take decision in short-term operation (congestion management) 
as well as in long-term planning (grid reinforcement). 
 
5.3.4 Decentralized Solutions 
 
Methods for the decentralised solutions of the congestion management problem in 
large interconnected power systems are proposed in [69] and [70]. The multi-area 
congestion management is achieved through cross-border co-ordinated 
redispatching by regional transmission system operators. The coordination is 
performed through a pricing mechanism inspired by Lagrangian relaxation. The 
prices used for the co-ordination of the regional sub-problem solutions are the 
prices of electricity exchanges between adjacent areas. 
 
5.4 Congestion Management Around-The-World 
 
The state-of-the-art in congestion management distinguishes the available methods 
and practices into two fundamental schools of thoughts. One is based on flow gate 
(FG) (transmission path reservation) [74] and the other based on central optimum 
dispatch [23], [75] and [76]. In the FG approach, firm transmission rights for 
transmission paths are acquired or traded well in advance of actual power delivery 
date and are priced independently from the energy and reserve markets. The FG 
approach is more consistent with traditional transmission reservation practices and 
is highly desirable, especially for bilateral markets due to the certainty of 
transmission reservation and prices. However it may not lead to optimum use of 
transmission system capacity and is incompatible with the operation of a pool 
electricity market. In a central optimum dispatch, mainly used in pool markets, 
transmission congestion management is performed as part of the optimum dispatch 
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of system resources, and congestion pricing is the by-product of the optimum 
dispatch. In this approach, while transmission system is optimally used, lack of 
certainty in transmission capacity and prices is considered detrimental to the 
development and operation of the overall electricity markets. 
5.4.1 Nordic Markets 
 
In the Nordic electricity market, market-adapted methods are used to manage 
bottlenecks, i.e., market splitting and counter-trade. Both principles are used 
simultaneously in the joint market, primarily at national borders. It was decided 
not to rectify anticipated bottlenecks on the grid during the planning phase, instead 
dealing with them during the operation phase in real-time using counter-trading in 
Sweden [72]. 
A. Market splitting:  
 
Market splitting is used to limit transmission at just a few determined borders, 
primarily borders between countries, and internally in Norway. Market splitting is 
carried out by NordPool. The auction principle on the spot market enables the 
management of potential bottlenecks on the network during the operational 
planning phase (i.e., the day prior to delivery). The market is divided up into 
different price areas. The different prices in the areas provide the players with 
signals for once again planning their production or consumption. After the spot 
market has held its auction, the ensuing trade can indicate that the transmission of 
electricity through a bottleneck will exceed the capacity. The market is then split 
and separate prices and volumes for the different areas are worked out. The ISOs 
then ensure that the network capacity at the bottleneck is utilized by adjusting the 
estimated price in the low-price area. The volume of electricity which may be 
transmitted is included when the price for the high-price area is calculated. 
B. Counter-trade 
 
This is practiced in Sweden wherein, if transmission needs to be reduced between 
two areas within Sweden, an increased level of electricity production can be 
ordered in the area with a shortage of production at the same time as a decreased 
level of production in the area with a surplus. This is known as counter-trade and 
is carried out with the assistance of the balance service. Counter-trade is used 
during the delivery hour (i.e., real-time) in order to deal with bottle necks, which 
can arise anywhere on the network. Via the balance service the ISO receives 
information about resources in order to be able to regulate the balance at different 
geographical locations. 
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5.4.2 Spain 
 
The Spanish electricity market as it started on 1st January, 1998 is based on two 
separate entities: the market operator (MO) and the system operator (SO). The MO 
receives the bidding of generation and demand for each hour of the following day 
and clears the market according to economic criteria. The SO is responsible for the 
secure operation of the power system and owns the transmission system. One of 
the main tasks of the SO consists of solving the power system constraints that arise 
after the market has been cleared [4]. Power system constraints are addressed by 
increasing and decreasing the generation of connected units, and by connecting 
off-line ones. Power system constraints are solved in Spain minimizing the system 
cost variation of the initial market clearing, fullfilling the power system security 
criteria. The units that increase their output are paid at their bid prize. Generators 
that decrease their output are not compensated for their income reduction. 
Therefore, the total system cost is computed by adding the bid cost of new 
connected generation, and subtracting the decreased energy times the system 
marginal price. The SO computes the unit re-dispatch taking into account the bids 
submitted by the generating agents into the market. A generation bid consists of a 
set of power-prize blocks for each hour of the following day. A minimum income 
complex condition is also submitted in the bid. This condition consists on a fixed 
income term and a variable income term. The fixed term internalizes the start up 
cost of the thermal generating units.  
 
As has been established in the market rules, both the SO and the MO participate 
in the solution procedure. The generation re-dispatch determined by the SO to 
solve power system constraints is sent to the MO. It should be noted that the SO 
must submit to the MO only the variation of generation needed to eliminate power 
system constraints. The MO includes the re-dispatch provided by the SO in the 
initial market clearing, and restores the generation-demand balance by adjusting 
the least expensive units according to the bids submitted by the agents. The 
security criteria of the Spanish power system require that power system variables 
(system frequency, branch power flows and bus voltages) are within their limits 
not only in normal operating conditions but also when any credible contingency 
occurs [15]. The contingencies under consideration are the loss of any single 
transmission line, generator or transformer, the loss of the double circuits that 
share more than 30 km and the combined loss of certain generators and 
transmission lines. Spanish regulation imposes a preventive operation of the power 
system for these postulated contingencies. Of course, branch and bus limits in case 
of N-1 and N-2 contingencies are different than the limits under normal operating 
condition. Branch power flow limits also depend on the season of the year. 
 75 
CHAPTER 5: TRANSMISSION CONGESTION MANAGEMENT IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
5.4.3 North America 
A. ERCOT (Texas) 
ERCOT uses a zonal, portfolio-based model that classifies the region into zones 
and identifies the commercially significant interfaces between the zones as 
Commercially Significant Constraints (CSC). In 2001 there were three zones and 
two CSC while in 2002 there were four zones and four CSC. Implicit assumptions 
under the ERCOT zonal model include [73], [78]: 
 
 All generators in a zone have the same shift factors with respect to CSC 
 A generator in one zone does not impact local congestion in other zones (zero 
shift factor on out of zone lines) 
 
ERCOT solves zonal and local congestion in two steps, in conjunction with a 
security constrained dispatch. In the first step, ERCOT clears the predefined CSC 
congestion, dispatches zonal balancing energy, sets the shadow price of each CSC, 
and determines the market clearing price for each congestion zone. Balancing 
Energy Service offers are procured by ERCOT in each zone for zonal load 
balancing and for inter-zonal congestion relief. The market clearing price for 
energy (MCPE) is determined in each zone based on the portfolio of zonal offer 
curves for balancing energy. If there is no zonal congestion, the MCPE is the same 
for the entire ERCOT region. In the second step, ERCOT uses resource specific 
premiums to clear local constraints and to issue resource specific instructions to 
relieve local congestion, and it uses additional resource specific instructions to 
rebalance the zonal energy. These resource specific instructions are called “Local 
Balancing Energy Service.” Generators submit resource specific premiums that 
specify the additional payments (in addition to the zonal MCPE) that they require 
for the deployment of incremental or decremental balancing energy from the 
associated, specific resource, if a Market Solution exists. However, more than 90 
percent of the time in 2001 and 2002 a Market Solution did not exist. When a 
Market Solution does not exist, ERCOT issues out-of-merit (OOM) dispatch 
instructions. Generators who provide OOM services are paid for production costs 
based on Resource Category Generic Fuel Cost, Resource Category Generic 
Startup Cost and Resource Category Generic Operational Cost can work well. If 
there is substantial local congestion, the simplified assumptions imbedded in the 
zonal model may break down, and pricing of a large number of transmission 
constraints may be needed for efficient dispatch and location of new resources.  
B. PJM ISO 
In PJM, FTRs are available to firm point-to-point and network transmission 
customers as a hedge against congestion charges. The firm transmission customers 
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have access to FTRs because they pay the cost of the transmission network that 
makes firm energy delivery possible. Individual firm transmission customers 
receive FTRs to the extent that they are consistent both with the physical 
capability of the transmission system and with the other firm transmission 
customers’ requests for FTRs [58], [77]. 
 
In June 2003, PJM replaced the direct allocation of FTRs with an allocation of 
Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) coupled with an Annual FTR Auction. The 
annual FTR auction permits market participants to bid for the FTRs and thus 
provides a market-based determination of both ARR and FTR value. Both ARRs 
and FTRs are financial instruments that entitle the holder to receive revenues (or 
pay charges) based on nodal price differences. The value of the ARRs is based on 
differences in nodal prices across selected paths that result from the Annual FTR 
Auction. The price of FTRs is determined by the auction results. The value of the 
FTR hedge is a function of the nodal prices in the hourly Day-Ahead Energy 
Market. ARR and FTR holders do not need to deliver energy to receive ARR or 
FTR credits, and neither instrument represents a right to the physical delivery of 
power. Both can, however, protect load-serving entities (LSEs) and other market 
participants from uncertain costs caused by transmission congestion in the PJM 
Day-Ahead Market. Market participants can also hedge against real-time 
congestion by matching real-time energy schedules with day-ahead energy 
schedules. 
C. California ISO: 
 
In the California market, a FTR is defined as a 1-MW portion of the available 
transmission capacity (ATC) on a specific inter-zonal transmission interface or 
inter-tie, going in one direction only, from an originating zone to a contiguous 
receiving zone. FTRs have both a financial and physical attribute. The financial 
attribute entitles the owner to a share of the path’s congestion revenues, and as 
such, they provide a financial hedge for scheduling on that path. The physical 
aspect pertains to the fact that the day-ahead energy schedules of FTR holders 
have higher priority against curtailment than the schedules of non-FTR holders. 
However, there is no FTR scheduling priority in the hour-ahead market. The 
CAISO does not require that FTR owners be CAISO scheduling coordinators 
(SCs). FTRs may be purchased by any qualified bidder purely as an investment to 
enable the owner to receive a stream of income from the congestion usage 
revenues. In order to be used in scheduling, however, an FTR must be assigned to 
one of the SCs. In addition, an owner may resell the FTR or the scheduling rights 
may be unbundled from the revenue rights and sold or transferred to another party 
[59]. 
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Intra-zonal congestion can occur either in areas where generation is clustered 
together, with insufficient transmission access to allow the energy out, or where 
load is concentrated with insufficient transmission access to allow competitively 
priced energy in. In both cases, the absence of sufficient transmission access to 
that area means that the CAISO has to resolve the problem locally, either by 
incrementing generation within the area if there is not enough, or by decrementing 
it if there is too much. The CAISO’s current method for dealing with incremental 
intra-zonal congestion is by dispatching available RMR energy in real-time in the 
first instance. Should that energy be insufficient, other units are then dispatched 
out-of-sequence (OOS) if they have submitted real-time imbalance energy market 
bids, or out-of-market (OOM) if they have not. OOS dispatches are so called 
because they require the CAISO, when incrementing [decrementing] generation, to 
bypass lower [higher] priced, in-sequence, real-time bids to find a unit whose grid 
location enables it to mitigate a particular intrazonal congestion problem. Units 
incremented [decremented] OOS to mitigate intrazonal congestion are paid the 
higher [lower] of their bid price [reference level] or the zonal market clearing 
price, and do not set the real-time market-clearing price. 
  
Inter-tie bids taken OOS are paid-as-bid. Available thermal units within the 
CAISO control area are subject to the must-offer obligation (MOO) whereby 
incremental energy bids are automatically inserted for them if they fail to do so 
themselves. There is no MOO for decremental energy bids. The provisions of 
Amendment 50 allow the CAISO to decrement generation for intrazonal 
congestion using bid-reference levels supplied by an independent entity. 
D. New England ISO: 
 
Congestion on the New England system was generally low, driven by two factors- 
lower-than-normal system peak demand during the summer months and fuel prices 
for gas units outside of load pockets increased relative to fuel prices for oil units 
within load pockets. This decreased the difference between the offer prices of the 
two types of generators on either side of constrained interfaces, thereby lessening 
the amount of financial congestion realized. When congestion occurred in the 
Day-Ahead Market, it was often due to levels and patterns of cleared day-ahead 
demand (fixed, price-sensitive, and virtual) and not due to constraints that would 
be expected during real-time operations [57]. 
 
Congestion hedging through Financial Transmission Rights– under standard 
market design (SMD), market participants are able to buy financial instruments 
that help them to hedge the price risk of day-ahead congestion caused by 
constraints on the transmission system. FTRs were offered to the marketplace in 
10 ISO-administered monthly auctions and one three-month auction during 2003. 
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Participation in the auctions was strong and market participants purchased FTRs 
consistent with expected patterns of congestion. Winning auction bids generated 
$28.5 million in revenue for auction rights holders, and the monthly and long-term 
FTRs awarded during the year provided over $84 million of day-ahead congestion 
cost offsets to their holders. 
 
Transmission congestion in the day-ahead market can cause prices to vary across 
the power grid. This causes more revenue to be collected from load in congested 
areas. To protect or “hedge” against the expense of higher LMPs, market 
participants may bid for the rights to receive a share of this congestion revenue. 
FTRs are financial instruments that entitle the holder to a share of congestion 
collections in the day-ahead market.  
 
In any hour, an FTR may result in either payments due or payments owed. 
Specifically, a participant holding an FTR defined from Point A to Point B will be 
entitled to compensation only if the hourly congestion component of the LMP at 
Point B is higher than that at Point A. If the hourly congestion component is 
higher at Point A, the FTR becomes a liability. In this case, the FTR holder is 
obligated to pay the congestion cost. FTRs can be acquired in three ways:  
 
 FTR Auction– the ISO conducts periodic auctions to allow bidders to 
acquire and sell monthly and long-term FTRs. All FTRs are initially defined 
by the bidders in the FTR auction.  
 Secondary Market– The FTR secondary market is an ISO-administered 
bulletin board where existing FTRs are electronically bought or sold on a 
bilateral basis.  
 Unregistered Trades– FTRs can be exchanged bilaterally outside the ISO-
administered process. However, the ISO compensates only FTR holders of 
record and does not recognize business done in this manner for day-ahead 
congestion settlement purposes.  
  
The effectiveness of FTRs as a congestion hedge by participants was mixed. In 
general, FTR auction prices should correlate with Day-Ahead Market congestion, 
which in turn should be a reflection of real-time congestion expectations on the 
system. A combination of recent changes to the transmission system, generation 
infrastructure, the ISO’s need to commit units for real-time reliability, and 
participant market strategies, including risk management approaches, all affect the 
patterns of congestion on the system, and therefore the FTR auctions.  
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F. Summary 
 
FTRs are used to hedge the costs associated with transmission congestion. 
Currently these rights are in use in PJM, New York and New England. A variant 
of FTR, which has both a physical and a financial aspect, was introduced in 
California in 2000. 
 
Some systems rely on distinctions among the priorities assigned to various 
contractual entitlements to transmission. In 1999, the California ISO auctioned 
annual contracts (which took effect in February 2000) for FTR for day-ahead 
inter-zonal capacity on that portion assigned to the ISO by the investor-owned 
utilities. These rights amount to about 50 percent of the ISO's average capacity 
available daily, and nearly 100 percent of a conservative estimate of the capacity 
available annually (i.e., for the entire year), net of contracts existing when the 
market was established in 1998 and expiring in later years. 
 
These FTRs differ from the "fixed transmission rights" issued by PJM, which are 
purely financial contracts entitling each owner to a refund of the difference in 
nodal prices on a specific point-to-point path. PJM's rights are allocated by an 
optimization in which bids for point-to-point transmission are used to simulate 
energy flows. Secondary markets for point-to-point financial rights are too thin to 
be viable, so PJM offers a monthly re-configuration process as a substitute. 
Financial rights suffice to meet FERC directives requiring each system operator to 
provide a means for customers to ensure "price certainty" if private markets for 
hedges against transmission prices is insufficient, as invariably they have been. 
 
California issues firm transmission rights for each direction for each interface 
between zones, including import/export interfaces. These rights can be assigned or 
traded in secondary markets. Like PJM's hedges, firm transmission rights include 
financial components because they provide refunds of inter-zonal usage charges, 
although these refunds are nil in the specified direction if congestion is in the 
reverse direction (i.e., no credit is given for counter flows). 
 
The transformation from a nodal or zonal system into a flow-based system is 
relatively straightforward. It can be accomplished by using the power transfer 
distribution factors as the exchange rates to translate transmission rights from one 
system to another without significantly affecting the existing market processes and 
institutions. After translating into a flow-based system, the main difference 
between the nodal- and zonal-based rights lies in the different numbers displayed 
in the PTDF matrix. Immediately, this will obviate the need for bid 
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reconfiguration in PJM and rezoning in California (for intra-zonal congestion 
problems). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents a systematic and comprehensive review of the current 
research trends in the issues related to transmission congestion management, as 
well as its practical implementation in the deregulated electricity markets around 
the world. It should be noted that depending on the structure and objectives of the 
electricity market, different congestion management methods are put into practice. 
Effective congestion management will help mitigate the effects of market power in 
electricity markets [1],[71],[17]. Attempt has been made to cover most major 
research publications on transmission congestion management in deregulated 
electricity markets. This list is by no means complete. It could, however, serve as 
an essential guideline and a succinct account for any researcher who wishes to 
work in this challenging field. 
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CHAPTER 6*
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD SERVICES FOR TRANSMISSION 
CONGESTION MANAGEMENT  
 
This chapter presents two approaches to congestion management using 
interruptible loads. The first approach is based on an AC optimal power 
flow framework which can be used for the real-time selection of 
interruptible load offers while satisfying the congestion management 
objective. The method is based on the calculated factors, termed as 
congestion relief indices (CRI) determined for each bus with respect to a 
particular line and specifically denote the "relief ability" of a load with 
respect to a certain transmission line. The first method does not utilize the 
constraints on power flow, and hence in some cases, the model is not able 
to remove all transmission congestion. The second approach proposed, is 
based on a dc optimal power flow framework, and overcomes the 
drawback of the first approach. The proposed congestion management 
scheme using interruptible loads can specifically identify load buses 
where corrective measures are needed for relieving congestion on a 
particular transmission corridor. The N-1 contingency criterion has been 
taken into account to simulate various cases and hence examine the 
effectiveness of the proposed method. It has been shown that the method 
can assist the ISO to remove the overload from lines in both normal and 
contingency conditions in an optimal manner. 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The present chapter proposes an integrated technical-cum-market based 
framework for congestion management, which uses interruptible load services as a 
tool for the ISO to provide transmission congestion relief in the dispatch stage. 
                                                     
* The work contained in this chapter has been published in the following papers: 
 
L.A. Tuan and K. Bhattacharya, "Interruptible Load Services for Transmission Congestion 
Relief", in Proc. of 14th Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC '02), Sevilla, 
Spain, June 24-28, 2002. 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya and J. Daalder, “Transmission Congestion Management in 
Bilateral Markets: An Interruptible Load Auction Solution”, Electric Power Systems 
Research, in print. 
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This chapter develops a scheme for the ISO to identify those buses in the system 
that can effectively influence the power flow over a particular transmission line. 
These factors termed as congestion relief indices (CRI), are determined for each 
bus and specifically denote the "relief ability" of a load with respect to a certain 
transmission line. 
 
The task of the ISO now is to find the most effective set of loads to be curtailed, 
both in terms of transmission relief and financial compensation. The ISO operates 
an interruptible load service market in the dispatch stage, one-hour ahead of real-
time. In this market, interruptible load participants offer their interruption 
capability for the next hour and their associated price offer.  
 
In the first approach, based on the obtained CRI and submitted offer information 
from interruptible load participants, a Congestion Relief Model (CRM) is executed 
every hour to obtain the optimal interruption schedule for transmission congestion 
relief. The second approach is much simpler than the first one, in the sense that no 
calculation of CRI is required. The model addresses the congestion problem by 
incorporating transmission constraints. The interruptible load contracts are 
selected against that constraint, among others. By this way, with enough 
invocation of interruptible loads, transmission congestions are completely 
removed from lines. The following sections will present the two approaches 
proposed and simulation results of both cases. 
6.2 Congestion Management using Sensitivity Factors 
6.2.1 Transmission Congestion Relief Index (CRI): Mathematical 
Formulation 
 
A set of parameters that determine the sensitivity of power flow on a line to load 
reduction at a bus is developed and presented in this section. These are termed as 
"Congestion Relief Index". Let us consider the basic power flow equations: 
 ( )∑
≠
−+=−=Δ
slackjj
ijijijjidgi YVVPPP ii
 ,
cos δδθ  (1) 
( )∑
≠
−+−=−=Δ
slackj ,
sin
j
ijijijjidgi YVVQQQ ii δδθ  (2) 
iPΔ and denote the injections of active and reactive power respectively at bus 
i. 
iQΔ
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The power flow on line i-j, connecting bus i and bus j, can be calculated using: 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }ijiijiiij IVIVP i ImsinRecos δδ +=  (3) 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }ijiiijiiij IVIVQ ImcosResin δδ −=  (4) 
 
where, Re(Iij) and Im(Iij) are the real and imaginary parts, respectively, of the line 
current on the transmission line i-j, corresponding to the power flow Pij. These are 
given below: 
 
ichiiijijijijijiij ij
YVYVYVI δδθδθ sin)cos()cos()Re( ++−+=  (5) 
 
ichiiijijijijijjij ij
YVYVYVI δδθδθ cos)sin()sin()Im( ++−+=   (6) 
 
Replacing (5) and (6) in (4) we have: 
 ( ) ichiijijiijijijjiij ijYVYVYVVP δθδδθ 2sincoscos 22 +−−+=  (7) 
 ( ) ichiijijiijijijjiij ijYVYVYVVQ δθδδθ 2cossinsin 22 −+−+−=  (8) 
 
Applying Taylor series approximation to (7) and (8), respectively, we can write: 
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Equation (9) and (10) can be re-written in terms of a set of coefficients as follows: 
 
jijiijjijiijij VdVcbaP Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ δδ   (11) 
 
jijiijjijiijij VdVcbaQ Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ '''' δδ   (12) 
 
The coefficients appearing in (11) and (12) can be obtained using partial 
derivatives of the real and reactive power flow relationships given in (7) and (8) 
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respectively, with respect to the variables δ and V. These coefficients are given 
below: 
 ( ) ichiijijijjiij ijYVYVVa δδδθ 2cos2sin 2+−+=  (13) 
 ( )ijijijjiij YVVb δδθ −+−= sin  (14) 
 ( ) ichiijijiijijijjij ijYVYVYVc δδδδθ 2sin2cos2cos +−−+=  (15) 
 ( )ijijijiij YVd δδθ −+= cos  (16) ( ) ichiijijijjiij ijYVYVVa δδδθ 2sin2cos' 2+−+=  (17) 
 ( )ijijijjiij YVVb δδθ −+−= cos'  (18) 
 ( ) ichiijijiijijijjij ijYVYVYVc δδδδθ 2cos2sin2sin' −+−+−=  (19) 
 ( )ijijijiij YVd δδθ −+−= sin'  (20) 
 
Again, let us consider the basic power flow equations (1) and (2) and apply 
Taylor's Series expansion. We get the well known matrix-vector relationship in 
terms of the Jacobian matrix J as given below: 
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1211     (21) 
 
 J11, J12, J21, J22 are appropriate sub-matrices of the Jacobian matrix J derived from 
the Taylor Series approximations.  
 
 Neglecting the coupling between ΔP and ΔV  and between ΔQ and Δδ  we can 
simplify (21) as follows:  
 [ ] [ ][ ]δΔ=Δ  11JP  (22) 
and  [ ] [ ][ VJQ Δ=Δ  22 ]  (23) 
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In this problem discussed, we will neglect the reactive power flows in the system 
in order to keep the computational burden low, and in order to explain the 
proposed method as well as to demonstrate the case study better. Reactive power 
flow equations can, however, be easily incorporated in this method without any 
difficulty.  
 
Then we can write from (22): 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ][ ]PMPJ Δ=Δ=Δ −   111δ    (24) 
 
where, [M] is the inverse of matrix [J11]. 
or,  
∑
=
Δ=Δ
n
j
jiji Pm
1
δ    (25) 
 
Since we have neglected the couplings ΔP - ΔV and ΔQ - Δδ, and also the 
reactive power flow, we can simplify (9) and hence (11), while neglecting (10) and 
(12), to get: 
 
jijiijij baP δδ Δ+Δ=Δ   (26) 
 
Using (25) and (26) we can write: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) njijiijjijiijjijiijij PmbmaPmbmaPmbmaP nn Δ+++Δ++Δ+=Δ   ...  222111  
 (28) 
 
Defining jkijikijijk mbmaCRI += we can have the following important equation: 
 
nijnkijkijijij PCRIPCRIPCRIPCRIP Δ++Δ++Δ+Δ=Δ ......2211  (29) 
 
Equation (29) denotes that the change in the power flow on a transmission line 
from a bus i to bus j is affected by the change in the power injection at a bus. 
CRIijk denotes how much the active power flow over a transmission line i-j would 
change with a unit change in active power injection at bus k. High value of CRIijk 
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indicates that the change in power injection at a bus k will have high influence on 
the power flow on line i-j.  
 
Now, if ΔPij is the overload power (i.e., the amount above the line transfer 
capability limit) on line i-j, the job of the ISO is to remove this violation of power 
flow limit. The ISO would consider choosing to change active power injections at 
those buses whose CRI values are substantially high in order to manage the 
congestion.  Since we assume that the power generation at a bus is not changing, 
thus, change in active power injection is nothing but the change in active power 
demand at this bus. Thereby, we now refer the change in the real power injection 
at a bus as real power demand reduction or interruption at that bus.  
 
It is noted that the treatment presented above draws on the same approach as 
discussed in [1] and the CRI is similar to the power transfer distribution factor 
(PTDF) as described in [2]. 
 
6.2.2 Optimal Contracting of Interruptible Load 
 
From (29) in Section 6.2.1, we have an explicit relation governing the change in 
power flow on a line i-j and change in real power injection at each bus i, using 
CRI.  
 With this information available a priori with the ISO, since it can be easily 
determined from a base case load flow run every hour, the task of the ISO is to 
manage an interruptible load market for transmission congestion relief. The 
various objectives of the ISO can be summarized as follows: 
 Total line power flow violations from contracted transactions is minimized; 
 Total ancillary service cost (which is the total payment to the selected 
interruptible load offers)  is minimized; 
 Mandatory requirements on maintaining a minimum level of operating 
reserve is satisfied;  
 All system operating constraints are within their limits. 
 
For the sake of continuity, we assume the same characteristics of interruptible 
load participants with regard to their offer price trends as that in Chapter 4 (see 
Figures 4-2) in response to system operating reserve forecast information. 
 
The optimal interruptible load contracts will be based on selected offers, 
specifying the interruption called for, from each customer type at each hour in 
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real-time. Each selected offer will be paid the uniform price, which is the highest 
accepted offer price. The market structure proposed here is similar to the one 
proposed in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4-1) and works on an hour-ahead basis. 
 
Figure 6-1 shows the working scheme of the proposed optimal constructing 
scheme for interruptible loads to aid in congestion relief, in which the ISO has to 
execute two consecutive models for every hour in a day: 
 
 The basic load flow model  (LFM) is to be executed every hour to determine 
the lines which are congested and CRI at every load bus. CRI will be used in 
the congestion relief model; 
 
 The congestion relief model (CRM), which is a modified OPF model, 
includes the interruptible load offers characteristics as discussed in Section 
4.3.2 (Figure 4-2). The objective is minimization of a compromise objective, 
including total line violations and ancillary service payment by the ISO to 
the selected interruptible load offers. The CRIs calculated from LFM are 
used in the objective function of CRM. CRM determines the uniform price 
to be paid to all interruptible load offers by the ISO and the total amount of 
load to be interrupted for each selected offer in the next hour. 
A. The Load-Flow Model  
 
The basic load flow equations, modified to include the power generation and 
demand separated according to those through bilateral contract and those traded in 
the spot market, is as follows: 
 
(∑
≠
−+
=−−+=Δ
slackjj
ijijijji
bimibimi
LFM
i
YVV
PDPDPGPGP
 ,
,,,,
)(
cos                                              δδθ ) (30) 
 ( )∑ −+−=+−
≠slackj ,
sin 
j
ijijijjiiii YVVQCQDQG δδθ  (31) 
 
The left-hand side of the equation (30) denotes the active power injection at bus 
i. From the LFM, those lines which are overloaded will be identified. The 
simulation of bilateral contracts for generation and demand is presented in detail in 
Appendix 1. 
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Figure 6-1: Schematic diagram of the proposed 
transmission congestion management framework 
B. The Congestion Relief  Model  
 
Objective Function:  
 
From equation (29) and our earlier discussion, ΔPij depends on the change in 
power injection at a bus, which is virtually the load interruption at a bus ΔPk. The 
objective of the ISO is to minimize the amount of congestion over the transmission 
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system by selecting to interrupt appropriate load buses. The CRIs identified in load 
flow model is used in the congestion management objective, which is to minimize 
total line flow violations: 
 
∑∑∑ Δ⋅=Δ=
ji k
kijk
ji
ij PCRIPVIOL
,,
 (32) 
 
The objective of the ISO is also to minimize the service cost for each hour paid 
to interruptible load customers selected for their demand interruptions. This is 
because if the objective function is only for reducing the congestion, the ISO 
would end up with paying a very high price for the interruption cost. The payment 
objective is:  
 ( )∑ Δ⋅=
i
iPDPayment ρ  (33) 
Note that ρ is the uniform interruptible load pay-price that is determined by 
CRM and is payable to all interruptible load offers invoked by the ISO. 
 
A compromise objective function is then formulated, combining the above two 
objectives as defined by (32) and (33), to satisfy the overall objective of the ISO, 
which is to minimize total line flow violations as well as total payment paid to the 
interruptible load offers. 
 
2
*
2
*    ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
Payment
Payment
VIOL
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VIOL* and Payment* are the minimum values of violations and payment, 
respectively, when these objective functions are individually minimized. These are 
already known before the compromise optimization program is solved. 
 
Load Flow Equations: 
 ( )∑ −+=Δ
≠slackjj ijijijji
CRM
i YVVP
 ,
)( cos δδθ  (35) 
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≠slackj ,
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The left-hand side of Equation (35) denotes the active power injection at a bus i. 
The change in power injection in CRM and LFM is the power interruption at a 
bus. Thus: 
 
)()( LFM
i
CRM
ii PPPD Δ−Δ=Δ  (37) 
 
Upper and Lower Limits on Buses Voltages: 
 
NGiVi ,...,1      constant, =∀=  (38) 
 
NLiVVV iii ,...,1     ,
maxmin =∀≤≤  (39) 
 
Upper and Lower Limits on Reactive Power Support: 
 
NLiQCQCQC iii ,...,1     ,
maxmin =∀≤≤  (40) 
 
Operating Reserve Constraints: This constraint ensures that a pre-specified and 
mandatory minimum level of operating reserve is maintained at all time.  
 
RESPDPDUCPG
NG
i
NL
i
ILM
i
iiii ≥Δ+−⋅∑ ∑ ∑max  (41) 
 
Limit on Interruption: Each interruptible load offer is represented in the model by 
a binary integer variable. The total interruption invoked by the ISO from is limited 
by the offered quantity: 
 
NILMiUPD iii ,...,1       , =∀⋅≤Δ μ  (42) 
 
The quantity offered by an interruptible load market participant is limited by the 
total demand at its disposal. 
 
NILMiPDa ii ,...,1            ,0 =∀⋅≤μ  (43) 
 
where, a0 is a scalar, 0 < a0 < 1, which determines how much of the demand that 
could be made available for curtailment by the interruption load market 
participant, without causing any economic loss to itself. 
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Market Settlement: It is proposed that the interruptible load market settlement is a 
non-discriminating auction where all selected offers will be paid the same price 
(ISO pay-price) which is the highest accepted offer-price. The ISO pay-price can 
be included in the model as: 
 
NILMiU ii ,...,1        , =∀⋅≥ βρ  (44) 
 
The CRM as described above, is a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem 
and is solved using the GAMS/DICOPT solver [3]. 
 
6.2.3 Simulation Studies and Discussions 
A. System Descriptions 
 
The CIGRE-32 bus system, which approximately represents the Swedish network, 
is used for the simulation studies [4]. Details of the system are provided in 
Appendix 2.  
 
B. Results and Discussions 
 
The models described in Section 6.2.2 and the system described in Section 6.2.3.A 
are used to carry out a case study to examine the operation of the interruptible load 
market and its role in removing the congestion in the system. The model can be 
used for 24 hours in a day, however, in the present chapter, the results for only one 
single hour are reported. Table 6-1 shows the total demand interruption and the 
total payments by the ISO during peak load hour (19:00 hour). 
 
 
Table 6-1: Load interruption and congestion management cost 
at 19:00 hour 
Total load interruption (MWh) 177.7 
Payment (US$) 4,442.5 
 
 
Table 6-2 shows the lines which are identified as congested lines in the load flow 
model. Those line violations are largely influenced by load interruption at the 
buses whose congestion relief indices are substantially high as compared to those 
of other buses. For example, the line 4072-4071 has 37.5 MW overloaded, as 
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identified by the model, the two buses 4072 and 2032 has significant high value of 
CRI, which means that interrupting the load at those buses will most likely reduce 
the congestion. The ISO would be able to remove those line violations by selecting 
the interruptible load offers in the interruptible load market. Those interruption are 
from buses 4072, 2032, etc., as tabulated in Table 6-2.  
 
Table 6-2: Line violations and demand interruptions 
Line Line flow  
Violation (MW)
Buses with 
significant CRI
ΔP  
(MW) 
4072-4071 37.5 4072 
2032 
19.5 
12.6 
4071-4012 62.4 4021 
1022 
1011 
35.2 
48.4 
12.4 
4012-4022 22.3 4031 
1012 
10.2 
13.4 
4031-4041 0.4 1044 
1045 
0.4 
0.0 
4022-4031 18.2 4062 
1013 
6.8 
18.8 
 
6.3 Transmission Congestion Management: DC-Load Flow Method 
6.3.1 Optimal Procurement of Interruptible Load Offers 
 
Optimal interruptible load procurement will be based on an uniform price auction, 
i.e. all selected loads shall receive the same price (interruptible price, ρ), which is 
the highest accepted offer price. Figure 6-2 shows the working scheme of the 
proposed auction for interruptible load for relieving transmission congestion. The 
scheme can be executed in two steps as given below: 
 
 Load Flow Model (LFM) - to be executed every hour to identify the 
congested lines. 
 Congestion Relief Model (CRM) - a modified OPF, receiving interruptible 
load offers from customers and minimizing various objectives by the ISO 
while satisfying the congestion management objective. 
 
It is to be noted that in order to create a fast and efficient congestion 
management tool as well as to demonstrate the method well, the models proposed 
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in this paper are based on a dc load-flow formulation which assumes the system is 
lossless and has an unity voltage magnitude at all buses.  
A.  Load-flow model (LFM) 
 
Load Flow Equations: 
 
The basic load-flow equations, modified to include the power generation and 
demand separated according to those through bilateral contracts and those traded 
in the spot market, is as follows: 
 
∑ ⋅=−−+
j
jijbimibimi BPDPDPGPG δ,,,,  (45) 
The simulation of bilateral contracts for generation and demand is presented in 
detail in Appendix 1. 
 
The power flow on line i-j can be calculated as: 
 ( ) ijjiij BP ⋅−−= δδ          (46) 
 
Once the power flows on all transmission lines are calculated, they are compared 
with the respective power transfer limits of each line in order to identify the 
lines which are overloaded. If line(s) overload exits, necessary actions need to be 
taken, and accordingly the CRM (as will be described in Section 6.3.1.B), is 
executed. The LFM is a linear programming problem and is solved using the well-
known solver XA in GAMS [3]. 
max
ijP
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Figure 6-2: Schematic diagram of the proposed interruptible  
load auction model for congestion management 
 
B. Congestion Relief Model (CRM) 
 
Objective Function:  
 
First of all, it is understandable that the ISO would not like to curtail demand at 
too many load buses, at the same time. One of the objectives of the ISO is 
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therefore, to minimize the number of load buses at which interruption is called for, 
denoted by NILS. This objective can be expressed as in (47): 
 
∑= NIL
i
iUNILS  (47) 
 
In (47), U is a binary decision variable denoting the selection (U=1) or otherwise 
(U=0) of interruptible load at a bus, from the set of buses (i = 1,…, NIL) where 
customers are participating in the interruptible load market. 
 
The other objective of the ISO would be to minimize the total power interruption 
invoked, denoted by PILS, and can be expressed as in (48): 
 
∑Δ= NIL
i
iPDPILS  (48) 
 
The third objective of the ISO would be to find the optimal set of interruptible 
load contracts such that the total payment made to the loads is minimized. The 
total payment can be expressed as: 
 
 ρ∑ ⋅Δ=
i
iPDPAYMENT  (49) 
Note that ρ is the uniform interruptible load market price determined from the 
CRM and payable to all selected interruptible load offers invoked by the ISO. 
 
As we can observe from the above, the ISO has three different objectives, 
normally of a contradictory nature, to satisfy different goals. However, the ISO 
would often desire to achieve all the three goals simultaneously. To this effect, we 
propose a 'compromise programming' approach that attains the 'best compromise' 
amongst different objectives. The three objectives above can now be incorporated 
into a 'compromise function' (50), which, when minimized, will represent the 
ISO’s overall requirement of meeting all objectives at the same time: 
 
222
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∗= ∗∗ PAYMENT
PAYMENT
PILS
PILS
NILS
NILSJCOMPRO  (50) 
 
In (50), NILS*, PILS*, and PAYMENT* are the respective optimal values, when 
minimized individually (Figure 6-3) [5]. It is to be noted that equal weights have 
been assigned for each component in (50), which however need not be necessarily 
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so, in actual markets. The ISO may choose to have different preferences for the 
three objectives, depending on the contractual agreements between the ISO and 
the interruptible load participants as well as the market condition. 
 
 
Minimization  
of number of 
curtailments 
Minimization  
of total  
cost 
Minimization  
of total load  
interruption 
 
Compromise objective 
Transmission 
line flows 
constraints 
Selected interruptible loads, 
market price, and total 
congestion management cost
 
 
Figure 6-3: Formation of the Compromise Objective 
 
The proposed "compromise" objective function (50) encompasses the basic 
issues that the ISO should incorporate in its decision making while procuring the 
interruptible load services. This objective function adequately represents the major 
concerns of the ISO that need to be addressed while invoking load interruption. It 
is to be observed that this objective function is somewhat different from the 
classical cost or social welfare (producer plus consumer surplus) based objective 
functions. Such an objective function is designed in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
using the classical objective function in these problems. For example, with a cost 
minimization function the ISO would end up with a stack of low-priced 
interruptible load offers irrespective of their location or impact on the system 
losses. On the other hand the proposed compromise function takes into account the 
number of interruptions, quantity of power interrupted and the payment to the ISO. 
This last term in effect does represent the social welfare under the assumption that 
the service providers offer their true cost / benefit functions. 
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Further, it is to be noted that the cost to the ISO is not the same as the cost to the 
society. The cost to the ISO is the payment burden that it has to undertake in order 
to procure these interruptible load services. On the other hand, cost to the society 
is the "congestion cost",  i.e. the cost of not having enough transfer capacity as 
required from the unconstrained market settlement [6],[7]. 
 
Load Flow Equations: We also have the basic power flow equations at a bus i, 
similar to (4). To include the contribution of interruptible loads, it is re-written as: 
∑∑ ⋅=Δ+−−+
j
jij
NIL
i
ibimibimi BPDPDPDPGPG δ,,,,  (51) 
 
The power flow constraints: The power flow on line i-j has to be within its 
maximum limit:  
max
ijij PP ≤  (52) 
 is the maximum transfer capacity of the line i-j. maxijP
 
Operating Reserve Constraints: This constraint ensures that a pre-specified and 
mandatory level of operating reserve is maintained by the ISO at all times. Since 
generator unit commitment decisions are beyond the ISO’s purview, operating 
reserve from committed capacity may fall short at times and the ISO would need 
to make such provision from interruptible loads. 
 
RESPDPDUCPG
NG
i
NL
i
NIL
i
iiii ≥Δ+−⋅∑ ∑ ∑max  (53) 
 
In (53), RES is the operating reserve requirement for the system. 
 
Limit on Interruption: The actual interruption invoked by the ISO is constrained 
by the quantity offered by customers for interruption: 
 
NILiUPD iii ,...,1       , =∀⋅≤Δ μ   (54) 
Bidding for interruption: The quantity offered by an interruptible load market 
participant is limited by the total demand at its disposal. 
 
NILiPDa iii ,...,1            ,0 =∀⋅≤μ   (55) 
 
 103
CHAPTER 6: INTERRUPTIBLE LOADS FOR TRANSMISSION CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
In (55), ai0 is a scalar, 0<ai0<1, specifying the fraction of demand at a bus, that is 
offered in the interruption load auction. 
 
Market Settlement: The interruptible load market is settled on second price 
uniform auction, where all selected offers are paid the same price ρ (interruptible 
load market price), which is the highest accepted offer price. The interruptible load 
market price is determined from the CRM using the following inequality 
constraint: 
 
NILiU ii ,...,1        , =∀⋅≥ βρ   (56) 
 
The CRM, as described above, is a mixed integer non-linear programming 
(MINLP) problem and is solved using the well-known DICOPT solver in GAMS 
[3]. Each of the three objectives are executed first with the constraints (equations 
51-56), in order to find their optimums – PILS*, NILS* and PAYMENT*, 
respectively. Subsequently, the Compromise objective is constructed and solved 
considering the constraints (equations 51-56) in order to arrive at the compromise 
optimal solution while clearing all the congestion in the network. 
 
6.3.2 System Studies 
A. Design of cases for analysis 
 
In order to simulate the interruptible load offers, to be submitted to the ISO, we 
use an uniform random number generator over a range of $30/MWh to $40/MWh, 
reflecting the peak-hour spot-market price, to generate offer prices (βi) [8]. The 
bid quantity (μi) is generated using a fraction multiplier range for ai0 of 20% to 
30% of total demand at a bus. However, it should be noted that these assumptions 
to generate offer prices and associated quantities is only illustrative at best and 
need not be the true in actual auction markets. Further, we do not consider 
strategic bidding (imperfect competition) issues in this work- wherein interruptible 
load participants’ offer prices might vary as a function of the level of reserve 
available in the system [9]. 
 
We simulate cases where congestions exist on a number of transmission 
corridors. A “business as usual” case, with two lines overloaded, is first 
considered. Subsequently, in order to demonstrate the robustness of the method, 
several contingency cases (with N-1 criterion) are also considered. The following 
simulation cases are considered in our analyses: 
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 Case A: “Business as Usual” (BAU) 
 Case B:  Contingency case with the transmission line 4042-4044 out-of-
service 
 Case C:  Contingency case with the transmission line 4021-4042 out-of-
service 
 Case D:  Contingency case with the generator 4041 out-of-service 
B. Results and discussions 
 
First of all, we identify the bottlenecks arising in the transmission system in 
different cases (Table 6-3). It is evident that lines 4022-4031 and 4031-4041, 
which are the two main transmission corridors of power transmission from the 
north (where there is abundance of generation) to the south (the load centers) of 
the system, are overloaded in the BAU case. In Case B, when the transmission line 
4042-4044 is out-of-service, it creates even more burden on the two lines 4022-
4031 and 4031-4041 which are already overloaded, and additionally, line 4042-
4043 also gets overloaded. In Cases C and D, the two lines 4022-4031 and 4031-
4041 are more heavily loaded, although no new congested lines are created. 
 
Table 6-3: Transmission line congestion in various cases 
 Overload (MW) 
Lines Overloaded Case-A Case-B Case-C Case-D 
4022 – 4031 727.95 760.30 1031.53 816.51 
4031 – 4041 20.55 155.07 321.34 166.85 
4042 – 4043 - 61.57 - - 
Total 748.50 976.94 1352.87 983.36 
 
Table 6-4 shows the offer prices submitted by interruptible load participants. 
For the sake of uniformity of comparison, we assume that participants offer the 
same prices in all cases considered. 
 
 105
CHAPTER 6: INTERRUPTIBLE LOADS FOR TRANSMISSION CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
Table 6-4: Offer prices submitted by interruptible load participants 
Bus No. 
Offer price
($/MWh) Bus No. 
Offer price
($/MWh) 
4072 31.18 1044 32.46 
4071 33.14 1045 31.31 
2032 32.84 42 39.33 
1013 30.86 41 33.80 
1012 31.03 62 37.83 
1022 35.45 63 33.00 
1043 37.92 51 31.25 
1042 30.73 47 37.49 
2031 33.89 43 30.69 
1011 33.59 46 32.02 
1041 32.43 61 30.05 
 
Case A (Business as Usual) 
 
Table 6-5 shows the selected interruptible load contracts by the ISO when each 
objective function is considered separately, i.e., minimization of NILS (hereafter, 
Min of NILS), minimization of PILS (hereafter, Min of PILS) and minimization of 
PAYMENT (hereafter, Min of PAYMENT). Also shown are the optimal 
procurement decisions for minimization of the compromise function (hereafter, 
Min of COMPRO). Depending on the objective function considered, the CRM 
selects the optimal interruptible load contracts so as to alleviate the existing 
congestions on the two lines 4022-4031 and 4031-4041. It also ensures that there 
is no new line congestion introduced because of the load interruption. The CRM 
also determines the market clearing price, which is the highest accepted offer 
price. We refer to the bus that has the highest accepted offer price as the price-
setter bus. The price-setter bus varies with different objectives and is shown in 
Table 6-5 by the underlined, i.e., 1043 in Min of PILS, 62 in Min of PILS, 1045 in 
Min of PAYMENT and in Min of COMPRO are the price-setter buses. 
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Table 6-5: Interruptible load contracts for Case A with different objectives 
 
Min of NILS Min of PILS Min of PAYMENT Min of COMPRO 
Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter- 
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) 
1043 109.70 2032 103.77 1042 133.98 1045 318.72 
1044 323.49 2031 47.65 1045 318.72 51 373.77 
51 373.77 41 271.85 51 373.77 43 237.36 
43 424.51 62 127.33 43 101.44 61 221.86 
  63 252.02 61 221.86   
  51 77.81     
  61 221.86     
Note: the underlined bus is the price-setter bus in each objective 
 
Table 6-6 shows a summary of the number of contracts, total demand 
interruption, total payment for congestion management, as well as market clearing 
price in each of the four objectives considered for investigations in Case A.  
 
Table 6-6: Summary results for Case A 
 
Objective NILS Interruption Payment 
Market 
Price 
(Min of)  (MW) (k$) ($/MWh) 
NILS 4 1231.47 46.70 37.92 
PILS 7 1102.31 41.70 37.83 
PAYMENT 5 1149.78 35.99 31.31 
COMPRO 4 1151.71 36.05 31.31 
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Figure 6-4 shows the plot of normalized values of the various objectives with 
respect to the COMPRO objective in Case A. 
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Figure 6-4: Normalized (with respect to COMPRO objective) NILS, interruption, 
payment, and clearing price of interruptible load auction considering different 
objectives in Case A 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6-4 that if the ISO minimizes only NILS, it would 
need to contract the highest amount of interruptible load as well as pay the highest 
market price and hence would incur the highest total congestion management cost. 
Now, if the ISO chooses to minimize the total load interruption requirement, it has 
to contract the maximum number of interruptible buses, while the market price is 
little lower than with the previous. Since the amount of interruptible load is 
minimized the total payment will reduce significantly. If we now look at the third 
objective of the ISO, which is the minimization of payment, we will see that the 
price and total cost are the least in all objectives considered, while the amount of 
interruption is still higher than that of the Min of PILS case. The number of 
interruptible load contracts required would be higher than that in the case of Min 
of NILS. In the compromise solution, we can see that the market price is the same 
as in the case of Min of PAYMENT, the amount of total load interruption is 
 108
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
almost the same as that of Min of PAYMENT case, while it has the number of 
contracts required as low as in the Min of NILS case. This could well justify a 
little increase in total cost as compared to that of Min of PAYMENT case.  
Case B (Transmission line 4042-4044 out-of-service) 
 
In Case B, when line 4042-4044 is out-of-service, there are three lines which are 
overloaded (see Table 6-3). It also means that more interruptible loads would be 
required to clear all the congestion as can be seen in Table 6-7. Similar to Case A, 
the price-setter bus changes with different objectives and is shown underlined, i.e., 
1043 in Min of PILS, 62 in Min of PILS, 1045 in Min of PAYMENT and in Min 
of COMPRO.  
 
Table 6-7: Interruptible load contracts for Case B with different objectives 
Min of NILS Min of PILS Min of PAYMENT Min of COMPRO 
Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) 
1043 109.70 2032 103.76 1042 133.97 1045 318.72 
1045 318.71 2031 47.65 1045 318.71 51 373.77 
51 373.77 41 271.84 51 373.77 43 277.21 
43 424.50 62 127.33 43 139.82 61 221.86 
  63 252.02 61 221.86   
  51 119.27     
  61 221.86     
Note: the underlined bus is the price-setter bus in each objective 
 
Table 6-8 shows a summary of the results of the number of contracts, total 
demand interruption, total payment for congestion management, as well as market 
clearing price in each of the four objectives considered for investigations in Case 
B. 
 
Table 6-8: Summary results for Case B 
Objective NILS Interruption Payment 
Market 
Price 
(Min of)  (MW) (k$) ($/MWh) 
NILS 4 1226.69 46.52 37.92 
PILS 7 1143.78 43.27 37.83 
PAYMENT 5 1188.16 37.20 31.31 
COMPRO 4 1191.57 37.30 31.31 
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Figure 6-5 shows the plot of normalized values of the objectives with the 
reference values being that of Min of COMPRO objective. 
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Figure 6-5: Normalized (with respect to COMPRO objective) NILS, interruption, 
payment, and clearing price of interruptible load auction considering different 
objectives in Case B 
 
Similar to Case A, Figure 6-5 shows the same pattern in NILS, total 
interruption, total cost as well as market price. The Compromise objective would 
best satisfy all the objectives of the ISO at the same time. Total cost incurred and 
total demand interruption required in this contingency case is higher than those in 
the BAU.  
Case C (Transmission line 4021-4042 out-of-service) 
 
In Case C, when line 4021-4042 is out-of-service, no new line overload is 
introduced unlike in the previous case. However the amount of overload is much 
higher now in the two lines, which would requires more interruptible loads to be 
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invoked to clear all the congestion (Table 6-9). The price-setters in Case C are 
now different from the two previous Cases, i.e., 2032 in Min of PILS, 62 in Min of 
PILS, 46 in Min of PAYMENT and in Min of COMPRO. The number of 
interruptible load contracts is also higher in this case as compared to the previous 
two cases. 
 
Table 6-9: Interruptible load contracts for Case C with different objectives 
Min of NILS Min of PILS Min of PAYMENT Min of COMPRO 
Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) 
2032 103.77 2032 103.77 1042 133.98 1045 318.72 
1045 318.72 2031 47.65 1045 318.72 51 373.77 
51 373.77 1045 65.33 51 373.77 43 258.39 
43 424.51 41 271.85 43 424.51 46 315.21 
46 315.21 62 127.34 46 14.67 61 221.86 
  63 252.02 61 221.86   
  51 373.77     
  61 221.86     
Note: the underlined bus is the price-setter bus in each objective 
 
Table 6-10 shows a summary of the results of the number of contracts, total 
demand interruption, total payment for congestion management, as well as market 
clearing price in each of the four objectives considered for investigations in Case 
C. 
 
Table 6-10: Summary results for Case C 
Objective NILS Interruption Payment 
Market 
Price 
(Min of)  (MW) (k$) ($/MWh) 
NILS 5 1535.97 50.44 32.84 
PILS 8 1463.60 55.37 37.83 
PAYMENT 6 1487.51 47.63 32.02 
COMPRO 5 1487.95 47.64 32.02 
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Figure 6-6 shows the plot of normalized values of Table 6-10 with the reference 
values being that of Min of COMPRO objective. 
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Figure 6-6: Normalized (with respect to COMPRO objective) NILS, interruption, 
payment and clearing price of interruptible load auction considering different 
objectives in Case C 
 
Figure 6-6 shows the same pattern in NILS, total interruption, total payment and 
market price as compared to previous two cases. The Compromise objective 
would best satisfy all the objectives of the ISO at the same time. Total cost 
incurred and total demand interruption required in this contingency case is higher 
than those in the BAU case. It is interesting to note that the amount of demand 
contracted in Min of PAYMENT is almost the same as that of in Min of 
COMPRO, while the number of contracts in Min of COMPRO is smaller than that 
of Min of PAYMENT. As it stands, Min of COMPRO is naturally the best 
objective in Case C. 
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Case D (Generator 4041 out-of-service) 
 
In Case D, when generator 4041 is out-of-service, no new line overloads are 
introduced. However the amount of overload is higher in this Case as compared to 
the BAU. It means that more interruptible loads would be required to clear all the 
congestions (Table 6-11). The price-setter buses in this Case are 1045 in Min of 
PILS, 62 in Min of PILS, 1045 in Min of PAYMENT and in Min of COMPRO. 
 
Table 6-11: Interruptible load contracts for Case D with different objectives 
Min of NILS Min of PILS Min of PAYMENT Min of COMPRO 
Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) Bus 
Inter-
ruption 
(MW) 
1045 318.72 2032 103.77 1042 133.98 1045 318.72 
51 373.77 2031 47.65 1045 318.72 51 373.77 
43 424.51 41 271.85 51 373.77 43 380.48 
61 221.86 62 127.34 43 244.56 61 221.86 
  63 252.02 61 221.86   
  51 218.53     
  61 221.86     
Note: the underlined bus is the price-setter bus in each objective 
 
Table 6-12 shows a summary of the results of the number of contracts, total 
demand interruption, total payment for congestion management, as well as market 
clearing price in each of the four objectives considered for investigations in Case 
D. 
 
Table 6-12: Summary results for Case D 
Objective NILS Interruption Payment 
Market 
Price 
(Min of)  (MW) (k$) ($/MWh) 
NILS 4 1338.86 41.91 31.31 
PILS 7 1243.03 47.03 37.83 
PAYMENT 5 1292.89 40.47 31.31 
COMPRO 4 1294.83 40.54 31.31 
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Figure 6-7 shows the plot of normalized values of Table 6-12 with the reference 
values being that of Min of COMPRO objective. 
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Figure 6-7: Normalized (with respect to COMPRO objective) NILS, interruption, 
payment, and clearing price of interruptible load auction considering different 
objectives in Case D 
 
As can be seen, Figure 6-7 shows the same pattern in NILS, total interruption, 
total cost and market price as compared to previous Cases. The compromise 
objective would best satisfy all objectives of the ISO at the same time. It can be 
seen that the amount of demand contracted in the case of Min of PAYMENT is 
almost the same as that of in the case of Min of COMPRO, while the number of 
contracts in case of Min of COMPRO is smaller than that of Min of PAYMENT 
case. It is interesting to look at Table 9, the interruption required is shifting from 
the bus 1042 (in Min of PAYMENT) to the bus 43 (in Min of COMPRO), thereby 
reduces the number of interruptible contracts while sacrificing a little in 
PAYMENT. As it stands, Min of COMPRO is naturally the best objective in Case 
D. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
 
The two proposed congestion management methods could specifically identify the 
bus locations where corrective measures need to be taken for removal of 
transmission bottlenecks in the system. An auction mechanism for interruptible 
loads has been designed and integrated with the Congestion Relief Models. The 
first method does not utilize the constraints on power flow, and hence in some 
cases, the model is not able to remove all transmission congestion. The second 
approach proposed, is based on a dc optimal power flow framework, and 
overcomes the drawback of the first approach. The N-1 contingency criterion has 
been taken into account to simulate various cases and hence examine the 
effectiveness of the proposed method. It has been shown that the method can assist 
the ISO to remove the overload from lines in both normal and contingency 
conditions in an optimal manner. It can therefore be concluded that with the proper 
contracting framework, interruptible load auction scheme should be an effective 
tool for congestion management of the ISO in the case of the dominant bilateral 
contracts market. 
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CHAPTER 7*
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT IN RESERVE SERVICES 
 
The first part of this chapter develops a framework for the determination of a 
long-term solution to the congestion management problem through "fast start-up" 
gas-turbine generators based on the traditional cost-benefit analysis. This 
involves a planning exercise to arrive at optimal location and size of gas-turbine 
generators in the system such that the total cost of investment and cost of 
congestion is minimized. A bus-wise cost-benefit analysis is carried out by solving 
iteratively a dc optimal power flow model. It is shown that the long-term 
investment decisions are dependent on the opportunity cost of gas-turbine 
generators with respect to the transmission capacity available and the associated 
congestion problem. 
In the second part of this chapter a least-cost optimization model is presented that 
seeks investment plans for fast start-up gas-turbine generators in order to provide 
for reserve and congestion management services. Since in the first part 
transmission congestion was used in the objective function, but not as a hard 
constraint, we experienced the problem that congestion was not totally removed. 
In the other method power flow constraints are introduced to completely remove 
the transmission congestion. The model thus evolved is an integer programming 
model and provides the optimal location of gas-turbine generators so as to 
minimize total cost of investment plus the cost of unserved energy. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 6, we have proposed the development of an interruptible load service 
market to address the problem of managing transmission congestion in deregulated 
power systems. We have also discussed in a previous chapter the various methods- 
both technical and economic- that have been proposed by researchers to address 
the congestion management problem. 
 
However we must note that electric power systems where transmission 
bottlenecks exist on a continuous basis require a long-term solution to the 
problem. In such cases, it is more a problem of insufficient available transmission 
capacity than mere congestion on a line that can be handled by a price-area 
                                                     
* The work contained in this chapter will be published in the following paper: 
 
L.A. Tuan, K. Bhattacharya and J. Daalder, “Optimal Investment in Reserve Services”,  
IEE Proceedings: Generation, Transmission and Distribution (in review) 
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separation or generation re-scheduling. In fact methods such as pricing, generation 
re-scheduling or even interruptible load invocation strategies, if used for 
addressing transmission capacity shortages, could introduce other inefficiencies in 
the system. The problem with these methods is that they may introduce the risk of 
increasing electricity prices due to the market power of local generators in the 
congested areas.  
 
To provide the level of reliability that customers expect, power systems operate 
with a generation capacity margin, called reserve. The cost of maintaining this 
reserve margin is significant, and it is in the customer's best interest to minimize it 
[1]. The paper proposes that in the long-run, this can be achieved without 
sacrificing reliability by giving an incentive to the generating companies to 
improve the availability of their units. This incentive can be achieved by charging 
the cost of reserve to the generating companies on the basis of their contribution to 
the reserve requirements. A unit contribution to reserve needs increases with its 
size and with its record of unavailability. 
 
Under deregulation, power plants can be built anywhere in the system, resulting 
in the imbalance between generation and transmission. Shortages of generation in 
some subregions result in bottle-necks within a system, raising reliability concern 
regarding sub-regional installed capacity requirement [2]. It is pointed out in [2] 
that there would be a need to determine locational requirement for both generation 
and transmission such that assistance to subregions under random generator 
outages is not restricted. The paper also presents optimization procedures to 
determine the adequacy and responsibility for locational generation and 
transmission. 
 
In order to address the transmission capacity shortage and associated congestion 
problems, the installation of reserve gas-turbine generators that can be 
synchronized with the grid within a short time, is a feasible option. The installation 
of gas turbine generators at different buses will provide relief to the system in 
terms of transmission line overloads in case of contingencies. It will help the ISO 
manage the congestion while stabilizing the market in the congested areas. 
 
This chapter consists of two main parts: 
 
 The first part proposes a scheme for evaluation of long-term investments 
by the ISO on gas-turbine generators. The objective is to determine 
optimal location and size of gas-turbine generators that can effectively 
reduce congestion in the system at minimum cost and in the long-run 
provide a solution to transmission bottlenecks. The cost defined here 
involves the cost of installing gas-turbine generators and the opportunity 
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cost of not having such provisions (OCG). OCG denotes how much cost 
the system would incur because of transmission congestion if the 
generator is not present. The optimal selection of location and size for gas-
turbine generators largely depend on a proper estimation of the OCG. 
Sensitivity analysis has been carried out to capture these dependencies. A 
heuristic algorithm has been proposed to carry out a bus-wise cost-benefit 
analysis to ensure that the selection of gas-turbine generators is cost-
effective in terms of transmission congestion relief, in the long-run. 
 
 The second part, on the other hand, proposes a least-cost optimization 
model for evaluation of long-term investments on gas-turbine generators 
to provide for reserve and congestion management ancillary services. The 
socially-desirable objective of minimizing the total cost of installation and 
operation and cost of unserved energy is used. Unlike in the first part, the 
transmission constraints are imposed explicitly, therefore, all the 
congestion in the network can be removed with the help of additional 
reserve capacity. 
 
7.2  Investment Plan Decision Making Framework: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Method 
7.2.1 DC-OPF Model 
 
The basic system analysis is carried out using a modified dc-OPF model to 
determine the investment decision on gas-turbine generators. A dc-OPF is 
considered here in order to reduce the computational burden significantly without 
affecting this basic principle of the decision making framework or without any 
loss of generality. The objective is minimization of total line violation cost plus 
the investment cost of gas-turbine generators (in terms of hourly investment cost 
plus operating cost).  
 
Objective Function: The objective function is designed to represent the ISO’s total 
cost of installing and operating the gas-turbine generators and the cost associated 
with congestion. The later component (VC) is basically the opportunity cost of 
not-installing the gas-turbine generator and is termed as congestion cost. It simply 
implies how much it would cost the system per MW overload without the presence 
of a gas turbine generator.  
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∑ ∑∑ ⋅+⋅=
i i j
ijii VCPVIOLGTGTCOBJ   (1) 
GTCi is the hourly cost of installing a gas-turbine generator at bus i, GTi is the 
decision variable on selection of gas-turbine and PVIOLij is the line-flow 
exceeding the transfer capacity limit of the line i-j: 
 
maxmax     ijijijijij PPPPPVIOL >∀−=  (2) 
 
Load Flow Equations: We have the basic dc power flow equations for bus i: 
 
∑ ⋅=−
j
jijdg BPP ii δ  (3) 
To include the power generation and demand of bilateral contracts and power 
traded in the spot market, (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
∑ ⋅=+−−+
j
jijibimibimi BGTPDPDPGPG δ,,,,  (4) 
The power flow one the line i-j between the bus i and bus j can be calculated as: 
 ( ) ijjiij BP ⋅−−= δδ  (5) 
 
Simulation of Bilateral Contracts: Appendix 1 provides details on how the 
bilateral contracts are constructed and included in the simulation model. 
 
Operating Reserve Constraints: This constraint ensures that a pre-specified and 
mandatory minimum level of operating reserve is maintained at all time. 
 
RESGTPDUCPG
NG
i
NL
i i
iiii ≥+−⋅∑ ∑ ∑max  (6) 
 
The dc-OPF model as described above is a non-linear programming problem and 
is solved using a well-known GAMS/MINOS solver [3]. It is to be noted here that 
the investment planning model would generally involve an exercise over the long-
term planning horizon, however, given the non-linear nature of our problem, we 
simplify the problem by calculating the “hourly cost” of the gas-turbine 
investment over its economic life (assumed 15 years) in order to reduce the time 
horizon to 1 hour in the present study. 
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7.2.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
In order to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the selected generator from the above 
model a cost-benefit analysis is proposed to determine the selected units that are 
cost-effective and in what size. The outcome of the cost-benefit analysis is 
incorporated in the dc-OPF in an iterative way to arrive at the optimal solution. 
Figure 7-1 and the following step-by-step procedure describe the proposed 
algorithm for optimal selection of gas-turbine generators: 
 
Step 1: Run dc-OPF model for 24 hours considering the hourly load demand at 
each bus. All buses are considered as a possible candidate for gas-turbine 
generator installation and constitute the initial selection set. The solution provides 
the preliminary selection of gas turbine generators at different buses in the system. 
 
Step 2: With estimated sizes of gas turbine generators, determine the standard 
size of the generator to be installed at each bus i and the total cost involved, 
considering a 15-year life. 
 
Step 3: The marginal benefit from installing the gas turbine generator on bus i is 
calculated by removing the generator and re-running the dc-OPF while other 
things remain unchanged. The difference in the objective function is the marginal 
benefit from the generator installed on bus i. 
 
Step 4: Calculate the benefit-to-cost-ratio (BCR) for all selected generators. If 
BCR for the generator on bus i exceeds unity, then that generator is selected. If the 
BCR is less than unity, consider a generator of lower capacity and recalculate the 
BCR to check if it could yield a BCR greater than unity. Otherwise, the generator 
at this bus is rejected.  
 
Step 5: Remove all rejected generators and corresponding buses from the 
selection set and go to Step 1. Go to Step 6 only when all buses have BCRs greater 
than unity. 
 
Step 6: Run dc-OPF considering only selected bus generators. If this gives a 
feasible solution, the selection is final. 
 
Step 7: If Step 6 results in violation of any constraint, additional gas turbine 
generators are included in succession at buses, where they were previously 
rejected in Step 4, in decreasing order of their BCRs until a feasible solution is 
reached. 
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Figure 7-1: Scheme for optimal location and sizing of gas-turbine generators 
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7.3 Results and Discussions 
7.3.1 Techno-Economic Analysis 
 
The CIGRE-32 bus system, which approximately represents the Swedish network, 
is used for the simulation studies [4]. Details of the system are provided in 
Appendix 2.  
 
The hourly load variation at a bus is accounted for by applying a load scaling 
factor (LSF) at each hour. The load at each hour h will be calculated by: 
 
h
i
h
i LSFPDPD ⋅=  (7) 
 
To begin with, one needs to work out a techno-economic analysis of gas-turbine 
generator using the unit's operating/name-plate ratings. Table 7-1 provides the 
techno-economic data of a typical gas turbine generator to be considered as a 
"candidate" at different buses in the system [5]. 
 
Table 7-1: Techno-economic data of a typical gas-turbine generator 
Data Unit  
Size (Cap) MW 100.00  
Capacity cost (CC) $/kW 395.00  
Fuel type Diesel oil - 
Net heat rate (HR) Btu/kWh 11,785.00  
Fixed O&M cost (FOM) $/kW-yr 11.17  
Variable O&M cost 
(VOM) 
$/MWh 5.00  
Economic life (EL) Years 15.00  
Fuel cost (FC) $/MBtu 6.00  
Interest rate (r) - 0.10  
 
Table 7-2 presents the investment and operational cost analysis of the candidate 
gas-turbine generator. The candidate gas turbine generators of 100 MW capacity 
are considered to be available for investment at all buses. A capital cost of 400 
$/kW installed capacity, variable operating cost of 5 $/kWh and fixed operating 
cost of 11.17 $/kW-year are considered for the study. Assuming a 15 year 
economic life, the total cost per MWh would be $131.8. 
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7.3.2 Location and Sizing of Gas Turbine Generators 
 
The method described in Section 7.2 is used to carry out a case-study to examine 
the role of gas turbine generators in providing congestion relief to the system in 
the long-run. In this case study, only one loading condition (during peak load hour 
at 19:00 o'clock) with LSF = 1.0 is considered. 
 
Table 7-2: Economic costs of a gas-turbine generator 
Cost component Unit Calculation Formula Result 
Plant capacity factor (PCF) % - 30 
Operating hours (OH) hour = 8760*PCF 2,628.00  
Capital recovery factor1  
CRF (10%, 15 years) 
- - 0.13  
  Levelizing factor (LF)2  
6% price escalation 
      - - 1.40  
Annual fuel cost (AFC) M$/year = Cap*OH*HR*FC*LF 26.04  
Annual fixed O&M Cost  
(AFOM) 
M$/year = Cap*FOM*LF 1.57  
Variable O&M cost  
(AVOM) 
M$/year = Cap*OH*VOM*LF 1.84  
Annual capacity cost  
(ACC) 
M$/year = Cap*CC*CRF 5.19  
Total annual cost (TAC) M$/year = AFC+AFOM+AVOM 
   +ACC 
34.64  
Hourly cost (HC) $/hour = TAC/OH 13,179.57  
Unit cost (GTC) $/MWh = HC/Cap 131.80  
 
Table 7-3 shows the selection of gas turbine generators at different buses in the 
network during 19:00 hour. As can be seen, after the first dc-OPF run (base case), 
six generators are selected by the model. However, only those at bus 4062 and 
1041 have BCR greater than unity. As described in Section 7.2.2, in order to 
calculate the marginal benefit resulting from generators at bus i, the dc-OPF is re-
                                                     
1 CRF is used to find the equivalent value of future annuity given the present investment equivalent: 
1)1(
)1(
−+
+= n
n
r
rrCRF  with r and n being the interest rate and number of years, respectively. More 
details can be found in [5]. 
2 LF is used to calculate the uniform levelized annual equivalent of an inflation series:  
( )[ ]
CRF
ar
LF
n
r
a
⋅−
−= +
+
1
11
 with a being the annual inflation rate. 
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run iteratively without a gas turbine generator at bus i selected in the previous dc-
OPF run. However, in the subsequent OPF run, a new set of gas turbine generators 
is selected instead with different BCR. The dc-OPF has to be solved iteratively 
until the convergence at final solution when all selected gas turbines have BCR 
greater than unity (4062, 1041, 1045, 4045). 
 
Table 7-3: Selected gas turbine generators (GTGs) 
Iteration Initial choice of 
GTGs at bus 
Buses with 
BCR>1 
Buses 
rejected 
1 4041 4062 4041 
 4062 1041 4063 
 4063  4051 
 4051  1043 
 1043  1042 
 1042  4044 
 4044  4061 
 4061   
 1041   
2 4062 4062 4072 
 4072 1041 4012 
 4012 1045 4021 
 1045  42 
 4021  62 
 42   
 62   
3 4062 4062 None 
 1041 1041  
 1045 1045  
 4045 4045  
7.3.3 Evaluation of Network Support by Gas-Turbine Generators 
 
An index to quantify total transmission system congestion, Congestion Index (CI) 
[6], is used, which indicates the contribution of the gas-turbine generator to 
providing congestion relief: 
 
( ) max2
,
max             /5.0 ijij
ji
ijij PPNTPPCI >∀−⋅= ∑  (8) 
where, NT is the number of transmission lines. 
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Figure 7-2 shows the CI over a 24 hours time period in the system with and 
without the support of gas turbine generators. As can be seen, the installation of 
gas turbines has provided substantial support to improve network loading 
condition, especially during the peak hour (19:00 hours). 
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Figure 7-2: Congestion Index 
 
In case of very high load (LSF = 1.6), the system experiences a condition of 
"energy not supplied". Without the installation of gas-turbine generators, the total 
energy not served during this hour is about 4000 MWh. As can be seen in Table 7-
4, if the gas turbine generators are readily installed, it would otherwise reduce the 
total energy not served by almost 10%. 
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Table 7-4: Energy-not-served (MWh) 
Bus LSF=1.6 
without GTGs
LSF=1.6 
with GTGs 
4041 173.0 176.3 
4063 346.5 274.5 
4043 671.4 701.3 
4045 784.8 505.1 
4046 495.7 486.4 
4061 408.3 408.3 
1041 491.3 391.3 
1044 242.6 259.8 
62 8.2 0.0 
51 456.8 475.3 
Total 4078.6 3678.3 
 
However, it can be observed that the proposed model fails to remove all 
congestion from the transmission system. This is because the model seeks to 
minimize the total cost of investment and transmission violations. If the violation 
cost (VC) is accorded a very high weight in comparison to the investment costs, 
transmission congestion can be further reduced to a certain extent. 
 
In the next section we propose a new scheme that succeeds in arriving at optimal 
investment plans while also removing congestion completely.  
 
7.4 Investment Plan Decision Making Framework: Least-Cost 
Planning Method  
7.4.1  Model Formulation 
 
Objective Function: The socially desirable objective is to minimize the total cost 
of capacity and operation cost of gas-turbine generators and the cost associated 
with the energy not served. 
 
∑∑ ∑ ⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅=
i
i
i
ii
OM
iii
CAP
i UECUEUGPGTGTCUGGTGTCOBJ  
 (9) 
 
In (9), GTCiCAP is the capacity cost while GTCiOM is the operation cost of gas-
turbine generator i; UGi is the binary (1/0) decision variable denoting selection (or 
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not) of the gas-turbine generator; PGTi is the power generated by gas-turbine 
generator i; UEC is the cost of unserved energy which is assumed to be 
$320/MWh [7].  
 
Load Flow Equations: We have the basic dc power flow equations for bus i: 
 
∑ ⋅=−
j
jijii BPDPG δ  (10) 
To include the power generation and demand of bilateral contracts and power 
traded in the spot market, and the generation from gas-turbine generators, (10) can 
be rewritten as: 
 
∑ ⋅=⋅+−−+
j
jijiibimibimi BPGTUGPDPDPGPG δ,,,,  (11) 
Constraint on Power Flow: The power flow one the line i-j between the bus i 
and bus j should be within its maximum limit.  
 
max
ijij PP ≤  (12) 
 
max
ijP is the maximum transfer capacity of the line i-j, 
 
Pij can be calculated by: ( ) ijjiij BP ⋅−−= δδ  (13) 
 
Simulation of Bilateral Contracts: Appendix 1 provides details on how the 
bilateral contracts are constructed and included in the simulation model. 
 
Operating Reserve Constraints: This constraint ensures that a pre-specified and 
mandatory minimum level of operating reserve is maintained at all time. 
 
RESUGGTPDUCPG i
NG
i
NL
i i
iiii ≥⋅+−⋅∑ ∑ ∑max  (14) 
 
Constraints on Maximum Total Capacity of Gas-turbine Generators:  
 
maxTGTUGGT
i
ii ≤⋅∑  (15) 
 
Installed capacity limit: Power generated from gas-turbine generator must be less 
than its maximum capacity: 
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ii GTPGT ≤  (16) 
 
The dc-OPF model as described above is a mixed-integer linear programming 
problem and is solved using a well-known GAMS/XA solver [3]. 
 
7.4.2 Least-Cost Selection of Gas Turbine Generators 
 
The model described in Section 7.4.1 is used to carry out a case-study to examine 
the role of the gas turbine generator in providing reserve services and congestion 
relief services to the system in the long-run. Table 7-5 presents the selection of 
gas-turbine generators (of 100 MW unit-size) at different buses in the system. The 
selection ensures that there is no congestion in the network and the reserve level is 
higher than (or equal to) the required level.  
 
Table 7-5: Selected generators and their impact on transmission congestion 
Line overload, MW Selection of gas-
turbine generators 
Transmission Line
Without  
gas-turbines 
generators 
With  
gas-turbines 
generators 
4011-4021 165 - 
4012-4022 84 - 
4031-4041 788 - 
4031-4032 136 - 
4022-4031 1675 - 
4044-4045 130 - 
4044-1044 391 - 
4031, 4041, 2032, 
1043, 1042, 4032, 
4061, 2031, 1044, 
41 
Total overload 3368 - 
 
 
Comparing the above with the results reported in Table 7-3, it is seen that the 
investment in the present case is significantly higher. In the previous case a total of  
400 MW of gas-turbine capacity was selected for installation which was able to 
reduce the congestion to some extent, but not completely. In the present case, a 
total installation of 1000 MW can completely remove all transmission bottlenecks 
in the long-term.  
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7.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter presents a method to evaluate long-term investment decisions on gas 
turbine generator allocation and sizing for the congestion management purpose. 
The chapter proposes that the ISO would be the responsible party to carry out the 
analysis and investment in order to have the available tool to support system 
operation. Network congestion is modelled and incorporated in the objective 
function of the model, not as a separate constraint. Therefore, the network 
congestion may not be removed completely in all cases. However, simulation 
results obtained in case studies have shown that the network overloading can be 
greatly reduced with support of the gas turbines at the selected buses. The choice 
of the value of cost associated with network congestion is found to have large 
influence on the selection and sizing of the gas turbine, hence the network 
overloading relief is provided. This chapter also attempts to provide an alternative 
method to evaluate long-term investment decisions on gas-turbine generator 
location and sizing to provide for reserve and congestion management ancillary 
reserve based on least-cost planning exercises. The method proposed could 
overcome the drawback of the previous method, which could help completely 
remove the congestion in all cases.  
 
 
References 
 
[1] Goran Strabac, Daniel S. Kirschen, "Who should pay for reserve?", The 
Electricity Journal, October 2000. 
[2] Narayan S. Rau, "Adequacy and Responsibility of Locational Generation and 
Transmission - Optimization Procedures", IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 19, No. 4, November 2004. 
[3] "GAMS Release 2.25", in A User's Guide, GAMS Development Corporation, 
1998. 
[4] CIGRE TF 38-02-08, Long Term Dynamics Phase II, 1995.  
[5] H.G. Stoll, Least-Cost Electric Utility Planning, John Wiley & Son, 1989. 
[6] K. Bhattacharya, M.H.J Bollen, and J.E. Daalder, "Real time optimal 
interruptible tariff mechanism incorporating utility-customer interactions", 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 700-706, 2000. 
[7] R.C. Dugan, T.E. McDermott, and G.J. Ball, “Planning for distributed 
generation”, IEEE Ind. Appl. Mag., Vol. 7, pp. 80-88, March-Apr. 2001. 
 130
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
 
Since the last decade or more, the electric power industry has been undergoing a 
vast process of reform mainly involving a transition from natural monopolies with 
centralized planning, to market based structures that are subject to competition. It 
has been generally claimed that deregulation would improve the efficiency of 
electric power supply as a whole and thereby benefit consumers. However, it can 
be noted that competition has imposed new challenges to the operation of the 
electric power system, in terms of reliability and security issues. The ISO is 
entrusted with the responsibility of keeping the system “healthy” while facilitating 
bilateral and spot market transactions by procuring various ancillary services, such 
as, operating and emergency reserves, reactive power support and black start 
capability, among others. 
 
In this thesis an attempt is made to examine the various issues related to 
interruptible load and how these could be integrated within the concept of system 
ancillary services and be managed by the ISO so as to improve the margins of 
security, especially during times of contingencies and transmission congestion.  
 
To this effect, the thesis has comprehensively discussed and compared the 
available methods for management of interruptible load from the published 
research literature as well as real utility practices in this area. From this survey, it 
is concluded that interruptible load management has a potential for providing 
additional reserves with the net effect being as good as supply-side generation 
sources at lower costs. 
 
The thesis further proposes a competitive market for interruptible load customers 
wherein they can offer to reduce a part of their demand, as an ancillary service 
provision, to be procured by the ISO. The operational objective of the market 
would be to minimize the total ILM procurement costs while satisfying the system 
operational constraints. It is shown that an interruptible load market can help the 
ISO maintain the operating reserves during peak load periods. Econometric 
analysis reveals that a close relationship exits between the reserve level and 
amount of interruptible load service invoked. It was also found that at certain 
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buses, market power may exist with the loads, and that could lead to unwanted 
inefficiencies in the market. Investing in generation capacity at such buses can 
mitigate this. 
 
It can be concluded that functioning of this interruptible load market would 
considerably help the ISO to maintain the system operating reserves by reducing 
the overall system demand during the peak load hours as well as in times of 
emergency. It is, therefore, very important to note that a proper contracting 
framework to attract customer participation, especially the large industrial 
customers, would enable the interruptible load market to function well. 
 
Transmission congestion management is an essential and important task in the 
operation of an electric power system. The thesis has provided a detailed review of 
congestion management methods available in the research literature as well as in 
utility practice, one of which is the method using the demand-side resources. It is 
therefore desirable to investigate the role of interruptible loads, in addition to its 
utmost objective of peak load reduction, in transmission congestion relief. To this 
effect, the thesis has examined the possibility of an interruptible load market in 
providing transmission congestion relief. 
 
Two approaches for procurement of interruptible load services by the ISO for 
transmission congestion management were developed. The first approach is based 
on an AC optimal power flow framework, which can be used for the real-time 
selection of interruptible load offers while satisfying the congestion management 
objective. The approach captures the “relief ability” of a load with respect to a 
certain transmission line through the important congestion relief index. The first 
method does not utilize the constraints on power flow, and hence in some cases, 
the model is not able to remove all transmission congestion. The second approach 
proposed, is based on a dc optimal power flow framework, and overcomes the 
drawback of the first approach. The proposed congestion management scheme 
using interruptible loads can specifically identify load buses where corrective 
measures are needed for relieving congestion on a particular transmission corridor. 
The N-1 contingency criterion has been taken into account to simulate various 
cases and hence examine the effectiveness of the proposed method. It has been 
shown that the method can assist the ISO to remove the overload from lines in 
both normal and contingency conditions in an optimal manner. 
 
 132
INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD AS AN ANCILLARY SERVICE IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
While examining the role of interruptible load in providing for congestion 
management, it is also necessary to arrive at long-term solutions to persistent 
congestions, i.e., a bottle-neck in the system. This calls for investment in reserve 
generation sources at strategic locations in the system in order to provide for 
congestion relief efficiently. A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis based heuristic 
method and a least-cost optimization based capacity planning exercise is 
undertaken to determine the long-term investment needs for fast start-up 
generators that can alleviate transmission bottlenecks and provide operating 
reserves. 
8.2 Scope for Future Work 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is very important to have the demand-side participation in 
the electricity market, i.e., the spot market, so as to improve the economic 
efficiency of the existing electricity market and limit the exercise of market power 
of the generators, especially the large ones, in the market. This thesis has 
established an ancillary service market for interruptible load customers where 
there is only one single buyer, the independent system operator, for their services. 
Such a market is termed as monopsony. Some of the future research directions 
with regard to interruptible load markets would be: 
 
 to study the price-elasticity of the demand-side, since it will help the ISO 
to predict the likely demand level in case of rocketing electricity prices. 
 to consider the recovery characteristics of customer loads after 
interruption, since, neglecting this may over-estimate the benefits of 
interruptible load management program. 
 to study the market power of the generators in the electricity markets and 
find out the possible solutions to mitigate these, one of which would be 
through interruptible load participation in the electricity market. 
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APPENDICES 
1 Modeling Bilateral Contracts 
 
In bilateral contract dominated markets, the generating companies can enter into 
direct contracts with customers that can be days, weeks, or even months in 
advance. In order to appropriately simulate such kind of energy 
contracts/transactions, a system of linear-equations is used denoting the linkages 
between various parties involved. Bilateral contracts simulated must adhere to the 
two basic rules: 
i) The sum of all contracts entered into, by a customer, equates the total 
demand of the said customer:  
 
∑ ==∀=
j
biji NGjNLiPDPGcon ,...,1;,...,1     ,,,  (1) 
Where: PGconi,j is the contracted demand (MW) matrix of a load bus i to be 
provided by a generator j. 
 
ii) The sum of all contracts entered into by one generator, equals the contracted 
generation of the said generator. Accordingly we have: 
 
NGjNLiPGPGcon
i
bjji ,...,1;,...,1     ,, ==∀=∑  (2) 
Note that in (1), although we show that j=1, …, NG; in a practical system, not all 
generators may have a bilateral contract with a load at bus i. In such case, the 
appropriate elements of the PGcon matrix will be zero. The same applies to (2) 
where not all loads i=1, …, NL; will actually have a bilateral contract with 
generator j. In such case, the appropriate PGcon matrix elements will be zero. 
 
Further more, the amount of generation from a generator j scheduled for bilateral 
contracts is within a certain range from its maximum generating capacity: 
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jijj
,...,1;,...,1                                                        
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 (3) 
Note here that we, however, have not considered the maximum allowable 
amount of energy transaction between a load i and generator j, due to the 
unavailability of data. 
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2 CIGRE 32-Bus System 
 
The Swedish 32-bus test system [1], as shown in Figure A-1, is used in the thesis 
for different case studies performed in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
 
Figure A-1: CIGRE 32-Bus Test System Network Configuration  
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Note that load buses which are represented by 2-digit numbers (XX)  are not 
shown in this figure, they are connected to the 400 kV buses (i.e., buses 40XX) 
through the 400/130 kV transformers. For example, bus 46 is connected with bus 
4046 and so on. 
 
The system can be divided into 4 main areas: 
 North: mostly consists of hydro power plants and some load centers. 
 Central: consists of a large amount of load and large thermal power plants 
 Southwest: consists of some thermal power plants and some load 
 External: connects to the North, it has a mix of generation and load 
 
There are 19 generator buses and 21 load buses in the system. The bus #4011 is 
considered as the slack bus. The main power transfer is from "north" to "central". 
The main transmission system is designed for 400 kV. There are also regional 
systems at the voltage levels of 220 kV and 130 kV. The generators and the loads 
in the system are simulated to participate in the bilateral contracts market as well 
as the spot market. The simulation of the bilateral contract market is presented in 
the following section. The detailed data of generator buses in the system is 
provided in Table A-1. The load data is presented in Table A-2. 
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Table A-1: Generators data 
Bus Pmax
MW 
Qmax 
MVAr 
PD 
MW 
QD 
MVAr 
QSh 
MVAr 
Voltage level 
kV 
4072 4500 1000 2000 500 - 400 
4071 500 250 300 100 -400 400 
4011 1000 500 - - - 400 
4012 800 400 - - -100 400 
4021 300 150 - - - 400 
4031 350 175 - - - 400 
4042 700 350 - - - 400 
4041 300 300 - - 200 400 
4062 600 300 - - - 400 
4063 1200 600 - - - 400 
4051 700 350 - - 100 400 
4047 1200 600 - - - 400 
2032 850 425 200 50 - 220 
1013 600 300 100 40 - 130 
1012 800 400 300 100 - 130 
1014 700 350 0 0 - 130 
1022 250 125 280 95 50 130 
1021 600 300 0 0 - 130 
1043 200 100 230 100 150 130 
1042 400 200 300 80 - 130 
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Table A-2: Loads data 
Bus PD 
MW 
QD 
MVAr 
QSh 
MVAr 
Voltage level 
kV 
4022 - - - 400 
4032 - - - 400 
4043 - - 200 400 
4044 - - - 400 
4045 - - - 400 
4046 - - 100 400 
4061 - - - 400 
2031 100 30.00 - 220 
1011 200 80.00 - 130 
1041 600 200.00 200 130 
1044 800 300.00 200 130 
1045 700 250.00 200 130 
42 400 125.67 - 130 
41 540 128.80 - 130 
62 300 80.02 - 130 
63 590 256.19 - 130 
51 800 253.22 - 130 
47 100 45.19 - 130 
43 900 238.83 - 130 
46 700 193.72 - 130 
61 500 112.31 - 130 
 
In this thesis, we assumed that 60% of the available electricity generation from 
each generator can directly go into a bilateral contract with different loads, and 
that the rest 40% of the available electricity generation will be offered in the spot 
market. Likewise, 60% of the total demand at a bus is entered in bilateral contract 
with different generators, and the rest of the demand will be bought from the spot 
market. 
 
Reference 
 
[1] CIGRE TF 38-02-08, Long Term Dynamics Phase II, 1995. 
 139
APPENDICES 
3 Regression Analysis 
 
Regression analysis is concerned with describing and evaluating the relationships 
between a given variable ‘y’, known as the explained or dependent variable and 
one or more other variables, ‘x’, known as the explaining or independent variables 
[1]. 
  
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is an econometric technique for calculating the 
regression equation that minimizes the sum of the squares of the error terms, i.e., 
the differences between the observed values for the dependent variable and the 
predicted values for the dependent variable. Consider a function, 
 
k ..., 2, 1,  i            )( =∀++== εβα ii xxfy  (1) 
 
In (A.1), the explaining variables are denoted by xi (for i=1,…,k); βi (for i=1,…,k) 
are the corresponding coefficients, and k is the total number of variables needed to 
explain the underlying relationship between y and x. ε is the error or noise term 
representing all those stochastic conditions beyond the control of the market 
participants, such as weather, generator outages, etc. 
 
The OLS technique minimizes the square of the differences between the observed 
value and the predicted value for the explained variable given by (2) as follows: 
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N is the total number of observations. The goodness of the fit of the underlying 
relationship, as predicted by the model, is denoted by R2 as given by (3): 
Squares of Sum Total
Squares of Sum Explained2 =R  (3) 
 
From (3) it is evident that the higher the value of R2 the better the model fits. The 
maximum value of R2 is 1. 
 
Reference 
 
[1] G.S. Maddala, Introduction to Econometrics, 3rd Edition, John Wiley and 
Sons, 2001. 
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